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Just Another Brother on the SCT?:1 What Justice Clarence
Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity
Angela Onwuachi-Willig*
Justice Clarence Thomas has generated the attention that most Justices receive only
after they have retired. He has been boycotted by the National Bar Association, caricatured as
a lawn jockey in Emerge Magazine, and protested by professors at an elite law school. As a
general matter, Justice Thomas is viewed as a “non-race” man, a Justice with a jurisprudence
that mirrors the Court’s most conservative white member, Justice Antonin Scalia—in other
words, Justice Scalia in “blackface.”
This Article argues that, although Justice Thomas’s ideology differs from the
liberalism that is more widely held by Blacks in the United States, such ideology is deeply
grounded in black conservative thought, which has a “raced” history and foundation that are
distinct from white conservatism. In so doing, this Article examines the development of black
conservative thought in the United States; highlights pivotal experiences in Justice Thomas’s
life that have shaped his racial identity; and explicates the development of Justice Thomas’s
jurisprudence from a black, conservative perspective in cases concerning education and
desegregation, affirmative action, and crime.
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The title of this Article is inspired by the movie JUST ANOTHER GIRL ON THE I.R.T (Miramax Films
1993). The I.R.T. is a line of the New York City subway system. The movie gives the female
perspective of growing up in black urban America . In many ways, it is the female version of John
Singleton’s BOYZ N’ THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991). Thomas’s story is, in a sense, a black justice’s
story.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Serving as a United States Supreme Court Justice is one of the
most coveted and respected jobs in the nation.2 Nevertheless, as with any
job in the public eye, Supreme Court Justices are often subject to
criticisms by many persons, both within and outside of the legal
profession. Justice Clarence Thomas is no exception.
From the very day that Thomas was nominated to sit on the Court,
he has been a subject of great interest for many and has been critiqued and
opposed by individuals from all walks of life.3 In particular, the Justice’s
intellectual abilities and competence as a jurist have been repeatedly and
continually challenged.4 For example, Justice Thomas has been rumored
to select clerks from the best law schools, to lean “‘especially heavily on
them,’” and to publish their draft opinions with “‘little embellishment.’”5
Additionally, Justice Thomas has had his independence as a voter on the
bench questioned, with the suggestion that he bases his votes on those of a
colleague, Justice Antonin Scalia.6 Indeed, Justice Thomas has been
referred to as “Scalia’s puppet,”7 “Scalia’s clone,”8 and even “Scalia’s
2

See WILLIAM D. BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED AND
EIGHT JUSTICES 1 (2004) (asserting that the United States Supreme Court “plays such an
influential role in shaping legal thought and practice” that it warrants special study).
3
Cf. SCOTT GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 3 (1999) (noting that between July of 1991 and December of 1997, “Justice
Thomas was mentioned in 32,377 newspaper stories”).
4
See GERBER, supra note 3, at 25 (asserting that “[t]he conventional wisdom about
Justice Thomas’s first few years was that his opinions were shallow and poorly reasoned,
he did little work, and he was a clone of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia with few
ideas of his own”);
5
See JOHN GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS STORY 167
(2001) (detailing claims that, while on the D.C. Circuit, Thomas selected clerks from the
best law schools and relied heavily on them and their writing).
6
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 263 (quoting a commentator as stating, “Putting aside
his political philosophy and his conservative credo, Justice Thomas doesn’t deserve to be
on the Supreme Court. He doesn’t have the intellect to be a member of the Court, and
that’s the reason, in my opinion, that you see Thomas voting with Scalia so often.”).
7
See Stephen F. Smith, The Truth About Clarence Thomas and the Need for Black
Leadership, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 513, 514 (1999–2000) (noting that Justice Thomas’s
critics claim “that Justice Thomas is merely a puppet of Justice Antonin Scalia”); see,
e.g., John Brummett, Glorifying Private Over Public, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 24, 2002,
at 4D (stating that “William Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia are right-wing idealogues” but
that “Justice Clarence Thomas is Scalia’s puppet”); Vincent T. Bugliosi, None Dare Call
It Treason, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 11 (referring to Justice Scalia as “the Court’s right-
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bitch.”9
As a liberal black womanist,10 I initially ignored these comments
about Justice Thomas. Ironically, a biography of the late Justice
Thurgood Marshall11—whose jurisprudence could not have been more
different than Justice Thomas’s—would bring me to commit an act that I
wing ideologue” and Justice Thomas as “his Pavlovian puppet . . . who doesn’t even try
to create the impression that he’s thinking”); Paul P. DuPlessis, Opinion, California
Letters Desk, June 1, 2001, at B16 (calling Antonin Scalia “the Supreme Court’s
puppeteer” and Clarence Thomas “his puppet”). But see GREENYA, supra note 5, at 13
(referring to an instance in which one trial lawyer asserted, “‘[m]y theory is that Clarence
Thomas is a ventriloquist, and that the puppet is Scalia”).
8
See, e.g., Ann D. Wilson, Opinion, Supreme Court Ruling Bad Joke, PALM BEACH
POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at 4E (referring to “Justice Antonin Scalia [and] his unqualified
clone, Clarence Thomas”); Carl Rowan, Justice Thomas Will Never “Come Home,” CHI.
SUN TIMES, July 4, 1993 (stating that there is “no reason even to hope that [Justice
Thomas] will ever be anything other than a clone of the most conservative justice,
Antonin Scalia”).
9
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 12 (2001) (quotations omitted) (recounting a story in
which Thomas was called “Scalia’s bitch”).
10
The term “womanist” is a synonym for black feminist or feminist of color. The
American Heritage Dictionary now includes this new term in its volume, defining
“womanist” as “[h]aving or expressing a belief in or respect for women and their talents
and abilities beyond the boundaries of race and class.” AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1978 (4th ed. 2000).
I use the term “liberal” or “liberalism” to refer to political liberalism. By “liberal,”
I mean a person who actively believes that Government should support social reform
within the system and favors the protection of civil liberties. A “liberal” may support
programs such as affirmative action or welfare, unions, and strong regulation of business.
11
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the great-grandson of a slave, became the first black
Supreme Court Justice in 1967. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 47 (1979). At the time of Marshall’s
appointment, President Lyndon B. Johnson asserted that appointing Marshall on the
Supreme Court was “the right thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and the
right place.” See Kevin R. Johnson, On Appointment of a Latino/a to the Supreme Court,
13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (quotations omitted).
Along with his mentor Charles Hamilton Houston, the former Dean of Howard
University School of Law (where Marshall graduated first in his class), Marshall
developed a strategy for eliminating segregation in educational institutions. In 1954, the
efforts of Marshall and Houston resulted in the landmark decision in Brown v Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which declared state-mandated segregation of public
schools unconstitutional. By the time Marshall was appointed to the Supreme Court, he
had won twenty-nine of the thirty-two cases he argued before the Court. See Mark
Tushnet, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, Lawyer Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1992).
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once thought was impossible: defend Justice Thomas.12 The biography
included a statement made by Archibald Cox,13 the man whom Marshall
had replaced as Solicitor General:
Marshall may not be very bright or hard-working but he
deserves credit for picking the best law clerks in town.14
As Juan Williams made clear in his book Thurgood Marshall: American
Revolutionary, like Justice Thomas, many “[w]hite lawyers in the top law
firms and law schools[,] had never been convinced that [Marshall] was a

12

In fact, I was reluctant to write this Article because of the reactions I thought it
would elicit. Many of my friends think it blasphemous to suggest that something about
the late Justice Marshall reminds me of Justice Thomas. The late Justice himself once
said scornfully of the nominee with comparably little litigation experience, “Think of
them comparing him [Justice Thomas] with me. . . . They think he’s as good as I am.”
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 393–94 (1998)
(detailing the life story of Thurgood Marshall the man, the attorney, and jurist). As I
worked on this article, I became more terrified of being called, much like Justice Thomas
has been called, a traitor to my race. See Randall Kennedy, “Sellout”: The Problem of
Betrayal in African American History (manuscript at 15, on file with author) (maintaining
that “the problem with blacks deploying a rhetoric that accuses other blacks of being
enemies engaged in racial betrayal is that such attacks are too powerful, too intimidating,
too silencing” and that it “causes black thinkers and policymakers to censor themselves
out of fear of suffering racial excommunication”); also Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Defining
Ourselves for Ourselves, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 610, on file with author) (same). Justice Thomas has been heavily criticized by several
prominent members of the black community. For example, film director Spike Lee called
the Justice a “‘handkerchief head, a chicken and biscuit-eating Uncle Tom.’” Elwood
Watson, Guess What Came to American Politics–Contemporary Black Conservatism, 29
J. BLACK STUD. 73 (Sept. 1998) (quoting J. Thorton, The X Factor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Jul. 15, 1991, at 17).
13
Archibald Cox, a former law professor at Harvard, was also the first special
prosecutor appointed to investigate Watergate. Former President Richard Nixon ordered
the solicitor general to fire Cox after he requested access to secret White House tapes as
part of his investigation. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG supra note 11, at 287–88.
14
WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 362 (quoting Richard Smith, Clerks of the Court,
WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1978, at A2). At one point, the National Review magazine ran an
article in which conservative Terry Eastland asked, “[O]f the 15 or so opinions [that] the
court assigned to [Marshall] during the term, how many does he, not his clerks, actually
write?” Id. at 384 (quoting Terry Eastland, While Justice Sleeps, NAT’L REV., Apr. 21,
1989, at 24–25).
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strong legal mind,”15 despite the fact that Marshall had won twenty-nine
of the thirty-two cases he argued before the Court.16
Indeed, much like with Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, some
critics had openly wondered whether Justice Marshall was dependent on
Justice Brennan in deciding how to vote in cases before the Supreme
Court.17 In fact, as several authors have noted, Justice Marshall was
privately referred to by law clerks as “Mr. Justice Brennan-Marshall.”18
15

Id. As Mark Tushnet of Georgetown University Law Center has noted:
The April 21, 1989 cover of the conservative journal National Review
captured a common view of Thurgood Marshall as a Supreme Court
Justice: it showed him asleep on the bench. This view, that Marshall
was a lazy Justice uninterested in the Court’s work, is rarely
committed to print. In the journalistic book THE BRETHREN, authors
Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong report an incident that presents
this view. According to Woodward and Armstrong, Justice Lewis
Powell expressed incredulity that, in a brief conversation, Marshall
had seemed to indicate that he did not know the details in one part of
Marshall’s important dissenting opinion in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez. They also report the “joke” told around
the Supreme Court building that the only time Justice Marshall saw
Justice Potter Stewart was in the hallways as Stewart arrived late and
Marshall left early. This view of Marshall is wrong and perhaps
racist.
Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 2109 (1992)
(emphasis added).
16
See supra note 11 and accompanying text; Tushnet, supra note 11, at 1277
(citing Andrew Rosenthal, Marshall Retires from High Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1991, at A1, A13) (asserting that Marshall was a great trial lawyer and appellate
advocate). Additionally, in their book THE BRETHREN, Robert Woodward and Scott
Armstrong depicted Justice Marshall as a man who failed to pay attention to cases during
oral arguments, did not do his work, regularly watched television in the middle of the
day, heavily depended on his law clerks in preparing for cases and writing opinions, and
was more admired for cracking dirty jokes during obscenity cases than for his legal skills.
WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 369 (citing WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN,
supra note 11, at 197, 258, 429; see also Juan Williams, Thurgood Marshall–American
Revolutionary, 25 ARK. L. REV. 443, 444 (2003) (discussing the importance of Marshall’s
legal contributions).
17
WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 402 (quoting Terry Eastland as saying “Justice
Thurgood Marshall will be lucky to rank somewhere in the middle of the 105 Supreme
Court Justices who have served the United States. . . . [Justice Marshall consistently
voted with Justice Brennan and] wrote few opinions of major significance, either for the
Supreme Court or in dissent.”).
18
See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG supra note 11, at 48; see also WILLIAMS, supra
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Later, after Justice Marshall retired from the Court, one writer would
assert, “Marshall worked well with Justice William J. Brennan Jr. . . . But
Brennan, a great justice by any standard, was the senior man in this
partnership, and when they managed to forge liberal majorities, it was
usually due to Brennan’s influence within the Supreme Court. It bears
noting that Marshall is retiring a year after Brennan did.”19 That same
writer, Terry Eastland, would also declare that Marshall was “not an
intellectual force.”20
Thus, the question arises: what does it mean that the only two
black Justices to sit on the Supreme Court, two Justices who could not be
any more different,21 have routinely had their intellectual abilities and
individualism questioned in the same way?22 Have both of these Justices
note 12, at 402 (quoting Terry Eastland, Editorial, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1991, at A9);
Smith, supra note 7, at 517.
19
Terry Eastland, Editorial, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1991, at A9. Even Chief Justice
Rehnquist has challenged Justice Marshall’s legal thinking abilities, once stating “I think
he [Justice Marshall will] be thought of as a great legal advocate, but I don’t think he
would have been thought of as a great legal thinker.” WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 402.
20
Id. (quoting Terry Eastland, Editorial, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1991, at A9).
Professor Stephen Smith of the University of Virginia School of Law has argued that
high rates of agreement are commonplace on the Supreme Court. For example, during
the same term that Justices Thomas and Scalia agreed 93% of the time, President
Clinton’s two appointees to the Court, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer, agreed 86% of the time. Also, in Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s first term on the
Court, he voted with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 93% of the time. As Professor
Smith points out, however, Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy are not “dismissed as
mere ‘followers’ of Justice Ginsburg and the Chief Justice, respectively, despite their
similarly high rates of agreement.” Smith, supra note 7, at 517; see also Scott P. Johnson
& Robert M. Alexander, The Rehnquist Court and the Devolution of the Right to Privacy,
105 W. VA. L. REV. 621 (2003) (reviewing privacy cases between 1986 and 2000 and
finding in cases in which Justices Rehnquist and Scalia sat together, that they (in addition
to Thomas) voted together 100% of the time, and that Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens also
voted together 100%).
21
See John Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged Blacks–
From Clarence Thomas to “The Law School Five,” 46 HOW. L. J. 175, 176 (2003)
(noting that “Justice Thomas represents so stark a contrast to what Marshall did and was
about”); Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence Thomas’s Prisoners’
Rights Jurisprudence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1334–36 (1999) (concluding that Justice
Thomas’s conservative jurisprudence is in part due to his attempts to distinguish himself
from Justice Marshall).
22
See David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924,
1956–57 (1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF
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been targets of the age-old stereotype that Blacks23 are lazy and
incompetent and cannot think for themselves?24 Or, more directly, to
what extent is Justice Thomas a victim of this form of racism?25
RACE IN AMERICA (1999) and discussing how the presumption of black incompetence
worked to hurt Larry Mungin, the book’s protagonist, at his law firm); Donna Gill,
Lawyers of Color: Encouraging Diversity, CHI. LAW., July 1992, WESTLAW (A black
partner stated “[m]inorities don’t come in with [a] presumption of competence. . . . They
come in having to prove themselves.”).
23
Throughout this Article, I capitalize the word “Black” or “White” when used as a
noun to describe a racialized group. I do not, however, capitalize the word “black” or
“white” when used as an adjective. I prefer to use the term “Blacks” to the term “African
Americans” because I find the term “Blacks” to be more inclusive. Additionally, “[i]t is
more convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white
than say, between African-American and Northern European-American, which would be
necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson,
Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1073 (1992).
24
See, e.g., PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1999) (describing the story of a black Harvard Law School graduate who sued
his law firm for racial discrimination and how the majority opinion of the D.C. Circuit
contained an underlying message that the young attorney was an unqualified black
lawyer carried along by affirmative action); see also SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM
DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA 5 (1998)
[hereinafter STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED] (noting that he “heard a white female
professional at a racially mixed table call Clarence Thomas an incompetent beneficiary of
affirmative action”); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER 133 (1990)
[hereinafter STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER] (“The accusation black Americans
have always lived with is that they are inferior – inferior simply because they are black.
And this accusation has been too uniform, too ingrained in cultural imagery, too enforced
by law, custom, and every form of power not to have left a mark.”).
25
Justice Thomas has argued the same. See Tony Mauro, Clerks: Minority Ranks
Rise, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, at 10. As Journalist Tony Mauro reported, Justice
Thomas proclaimed the following in response to a question concerning “criticism that he
is a “clone” of Justice Antonin Scalia: ‘Because I am black, it is said automatically that
Justice Scalia has to do my work for me. That goes with the turf. I understand that deal. It
is interesting that I rarely see him, so he must have a chip in my brain and he controls me
that way. But the fact is, no such cabal exists.’” Mauro also wrote that Justice Thomas
was later asked if he continues to write his own opinions and “deadpanned, ‘No, Justice
Scalia does.’” See Tony Mauro, supra at 10 (emphasis added).
In an article, Mark Tushnet argues that racism affected perceptions of Marshall as
being intellectually unfit for the court. See generally Tushnet, supra note 15. For
instance, in response to the argument about Marshall’s “overuse” of his clerks, Tushnet
demonstrates that Marshall’s “practices were not wildly out of line with those of others
on the Court.” Id. at 2112. Specifically, Tushnet reported:
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A review of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence reveals that there is no
basis for the claim that Justice Thomas is a “Scalia clone” or “Scalia
puppet” and supports the proposition that Justice Thomas has been
unfairly subject to the stereotype of black incompetence.26 In fact, Justice
Thomas has developed his own jurisprudence as a black conservative,
directly and indirectly weaving his own “raced” ideologies into his
opinions.27
In this Article, I draw on Justice Thomas’s opinions on the
Supreme Court in areas concerning education and desegregation,
affirmative action, and crime to argue that Justice Thomas’s
Chief Justice William Rehnquist has written that he has his clerks “do
the first draft of almost all cases” in his chambers, and that sometimes
he leaves those drafts “relatively unchanged.” Laurence Tribe reported
that “a number of opinions he worked on” as Justice Stewart’s law
clerk “are really almost exactly as he drafted them,” including one of
Justice Stewart’s most celebrated opinions. Indeed, all of the Justices
relied heavily on their law clerks, particularly for working out details;
as Bernard Schwartz explained in his discussion of the Burger Court’s
processes, “The Justices normally outline the way they want opinions
drafted. But the drafting clerk is left with a great deal of discretion on
the details of the opinion, particularly the specific reasoning and
research supporting the decision.
Id. at 2112; see also John B. Oakley, William W. Schwarzer: A Judge for All Seasons, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1995) (describing how much federal judges rely on the
help of their law clerks).
26
See Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J.
607, 614 (1998) (describing the stereotype of black incompetence and recounting a story
that demonstrates how “[i]f you have dark skin in this society . . . you may . . . discounted
in meetings, or assumed to be less competent than a white person when you walk into a
room for a job interview or to give a lecture”). In fact, Senate Minority Leader Harry
Reid recently expressed his strong opposition to the idea of Justice Thomas being
appointed Chief Justice, claiming that the Justice is an “embarrassment,” that his
“opinions are poorly written,” and that he has not “done a good job as a Supreme Court
Justice.” Zev Chafets, Slap at Thomas Stinks of Racism, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8,
2004, at 43. At the same time, however, Senator Reid has asserted that Justice Scalia is
suitable for the position because he “is one smart guy.” Michael A. Fletcher, Reid Says
He Could Back Scalia for Chief Justice: Comments anger Liberals and Thomas
Supporters, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2004, at A04. The seemingly obvious explanation of
the senator’s strikingly different opinions of two justices with similar conservative views
is the stereotype of black incompetence. See Chafets, supra note, at 43.
27
In this Article, I make no claim that Justice Thomas’s political views are immune
from attack. I challenge only those criticisms contending that Justice Thomas is Justice
Scalia’s puppet and has no independent voice.
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jurisprudence, while conservative, is, in certain important respects,
distinct from that of his white, conservative counterparts and is
intrinsically linked to his identity as a southern black man in the United
States.28 Part I of this Article examines and describes the development of
black conservative ideology in the United States and how such ideology is
distinct from white conservative rhetoric and theory. Part II of this Article
provides an overview of Justice Thomas’s background, highlighting
pivotal experiences during his childhood, education, and career that have
shaped his racial identity and his views about how racial equality should
be achieved within and through the law. Part III of this Article examines
and explains the development of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence as
participating in America’s long history of black conservative thought
(described in Part I) as seen in Supreme Court cases concerning education
and desegregation, affirmative action, and crime.29 Finally, this Article
concludes by exploring what the most commonly heard criticisms of
Justice Thomas teach us about race and the impact of racial identity.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY
[T]here was an appearance within the conservative ranks that blacks
were to be tolerated but not necessarily welcomed. There appeared to
be a presumption, albeit refutable, that blacks could not be
conservative. . . . Hence, in challenging either positions or emphases
on policy matters, one had to be careful not to go so far as to lose
one’s conservative credentials. . . . Certainly, pluralism on these
issues were not encouraged or invited—especially from blacks. . . .
Dissent bore a price—one I gladly paid.
30
–Clarence Thomas
28

Cf. Calmore, supra note 21, at 176 (noting that “our judiciary . . . is [not] an
impartial institution that stands independently against the tide of racial politics and
ideology”); see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 7–14 (describing the potential beneficial
impact of the appointment of a Latino/a to the Supreme Court).
29
See Calmore, supra note 21, at 192 (“[Justice Thomas’s] jurisprudence . . . is
deeply personal and his black identity and biography stand closely behind his Supreme
Court votes and opinions.”).
30
Clarence Thomas, No Room at the Inn: The Loneliness of the Black
Conservative, in BLACK AND RIGHT: THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES
IN AMERICA 8 (1997); see also JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE
SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 52 (1994) (quoting Thomas as saying “‘I don’t fit in with
whites and I don’t fit in with blacks’”); Robert C. Smith & Hanes Walton, Jr., U–Turn:
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A. The History of Black Conservatism
Although black conservatives have only recently begun to gain
widespread attention—especially since the appointment of Justice Thomas
in 1991—Justice Thomas is only one of a long line of black individuals to
espouse conservative ideas.31 Indeed, the development of black
conservative thought32 has deep historical roots, reaching all the way back
Martin Kilson and Black Conservatives, 62 TRANSITION 209–10 (1993) (highlighting
how “many black traditional Republicans . . . worked hard to have [the Republican Party]
deal with the plight of African Americans” and were excluded from conservative
administrations); see also Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 566
(2001) (arguing that it is important for law to address the exclusion of individuals who
seek both to retain cultural membership and to pursue freedom from discrimination and
repression within their cultural communities).
31
See Randall Kennedy, Justice Thomas and Racial Loyalty, AM. LAW, Sept. 1998,
at 91 (asserting that “Thomas’s thinking . . . [has] deep roots in Afro-American history
and culture as reflected in the idea of such figures as Booker T. Washington, Kelly
Miller, George Schuyler, Zora Neale Hurston, and Thomas Sowell”). As a general
matter, conservatives can be divided into three different groups: (1) the anti-statist
faction; (2) organic faction; and (3) the neoconservative faction. The anti-statist faction
of conservatism focuses on decreasing the role of the state in American politics. As a
general matter, this group of conservatives places a strong emphasis on the role of the
individual in society and, in turn, demands a strict limit on government control and
authority. The organic faction of conservatism concentrates more on issues of morality
and culture and is strongly influenced by religion. Today, this group of conservatives is
largely controlled by the “Religious Right.” The third faction of conservatism is the
neoconservative group, into which many black conservatives fit. The neoconservatives,
many of whom were once liberals, oppose the expansion of government and social
welfare programs (much like their counterparts). KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & LINDA J.
METCALF, AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES TODAY 151–152 (1993); Lewis A. Randolph, A
Historical Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Black Conservatism, W. J. OF BLACK
STUDIES, 150–51 (1995).
This Article focuses on the anti-statist and neoconservative factions of
conservatives and does not address the organic faction.
32
Additionally, there are various strands of black conservative thought. Peter
Eisenstadt, Introduction, to BLACK CONSERVATISM: ESSAYS IN INTELLECTUAL AND
POLITICAL HISTORY xv (Peter Eisenstadt ed., 1999). By discussing black conservative
ideology as a whole, I do not mean to suggest that all black conservatives “think alike.”
In fact, black conservatism is so rich and varied that it is difficult to define one particular
ideology as black conservative thought. As one author stated about black conservatism,
“[a]ny generalization about black conservatism is subject to the following two
limitations: (1) It will not be true of all black conservatives, [and] (2) it will be true of
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to the late 1700s33 and developing from a past ideology centered around a
gradualist approach to achieving equality that required a practical and
strategic accommodation of Whites to today’s black empowerment and
self-reliance themes.34
Although traces of black conservative thought can be found as far
back as the 1700s, the most prominent historical figure among black
conservatives is Booker T. Washington,35 who emerged as a leader of the
many individuals who are not black conservatives.” Id. at x.
Common themes and ideas, however, have persisted throughout the history of black
conservatism and pervade nearly every faction of black conservatism. For the sake of
simplicity, I have drawn together ideas from black conservatives (in particular, black
neoconservatives) whose views on the issues of education/desegregation, affirmative
action, and crime coincide with those expressed by Justice Thomas and refer to this
collection of ideas as “black conservative thought” or “black conservative ideology.” I
am not, however, making any claims that all conservatives or all black conservatives (or
all liberals or all black liberals) adhere to the principles described herein. For the
purposes of this Article, however, I have made generalizations about both conservatives
and liberals, ethnic and non-ethnic.
33
For example, Jupiter Hammon, a Long Island slave, is considered to be one of
the first Blacks to express black conservative ideas, in particular those that related to
Blacks’ proving their worthiness to Whites as a strategic move to gaining more rights.
According to Hammon, “[f]ree blacks had a special responsibility to uphold moral
standards, to avoid stealing and laziness, to prove themselves worthy of freedom, and to
dispel canards about black incapacity for self-directed lives.” Eisenstadt, supra note 32,
at xv.
34
To many Blacks and many Whites, today’s black conservative is viewed as an
accommodationist, a person who is willing to “sell out his or her race” to gain acceptance
from Whites. See STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 164. As
Steele explains, “[T]his is the most constant charge against the black conservative––that
he does not love his own people––an unpardonable sin that justifies his symbolic
annihilation. . . [a]n Uncle Tom . . . whose failure to love his people makes him an
accessory to their oppression. . . . Thus black conservatives do not yet comprise a loyal
opposition; they are, instead, classic dissenters. . . . [living] a life openly subversive to
[their] own group and often impractical for [themselves] . . . .” STEELE, A DREAM
DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 7–8; see also Sunder, supra note 30, at 566 (“[Individuals
are increasingly refusing to take their cultures lying down. Rejecting old notions of
imposed identity, more and more, individuals want reason, choice, and autonomy within
their cultural communities. They want cultural on their own terms.”).
35
Booker T. Washington was born a slave in Hale’s Ford, Virginia in 1858 or
1859. See BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY 1 (1900). After emancipation,
Washington’s family was so poor that he was forced to work in salt furnaces and coal
mines at the tender age of 9. See BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, THE STORY OF MY LIFE AND
WORK 48 (1900) [hereinafter “WASHINGTON, STORY”]; Donald B. Gibson, Strategies and
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black community during the post-Reconstruction era.36 Specifically,
Washington’s rise to prominence occurred in the late 1800s and early
1900s, a period that was replete with violence against Blacks, including
lynching, and consistent violations of the rights of Blacks as freed
persons.37
As a response to the repeated attacks against black people during
this period, Washington and certain other black men strategically formed
coalitions with white conservative elites as a means of ensuring the safety
of Blacks in the South.38 The ideology of Washington and these men was
as follows: “if [Blacks] play by [Whites’] rules, and prove [their]
worthiness according to [those] standards, [Whites] will have no choice
but to accommodate [Blacks].”39 In other words, acknowledging the
strong and often violent resistance by Whites to efforts by Blacks to have
their rights recognized, Washington and his followers developed a
strategic, gradual approach to achieving racial equality that did not
threaten to overturn the status quo too quickly.40 To Washington and his
Revisions of Self-Representation in Booker T. Washington’s Autobiographies, 45 AMER.
Q. 370, 374 (1993). When he was 16, Washington quit work to go to school. To
accomplish this task, Washington had to walk over 100 miles to attend the Hampton
Institute in Virginia. He paid his tuition and board there by working as the janitor. See
WASHINGTON, supra note, at 42-49.
36
See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 825 (1991)
(contending that Washington rejuvenated black nationalism during the postReconstruction era); Book Note, Rethinking Self-Help, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1714
(1991) (noting that Booker T. Washington rose to promise during the post-Reconstruction
area by telling Blacks in the rural South to cast down their buckets).
37
See Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1745, 1785 (1991) (asserting that Washington’s position “arose in the context of postemancipation violence against Blacks”); John Hope Franklin, Booker T. Washington,
Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1991 (same).
38
Randolph, supra note 31, at 153 (citing VAN C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW (1974) as explaining the emergence of black conservatism as the
result of a white power structure that was unwilling to tolerate demands made by black
leaders who did not accommodate white interests).
39
Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at xi; see also Randolph, supra note 31, at 151 (noting
that “Washington’s approach to improving racial relations was to accommodate White
interests”).
40
See Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., Booker T. Washington’s “The Man Farthest Down”
and the Transformation of Race, 48 MISS. Q. 239, 240 (1995) (noting also that Paul
Laurence Dunbar described Washington as “[w]earing ‘the mask’”). According to
Dickson Bruce, Jr., “Washington was a man who knew how to survive in a hostile white
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followers, Blacks had a duty to focus on their own economic and moral
advancement through self-help, rather than seek progress through legal
and political changes that required the approval and cooperation of Whites
because Whites would never accept Blacks until Blacks proved
themselves worthy of such acceptance or, more so, because Whites may
never accept Blacks at all.41
Indeed, for Washington and other “representative men of the
42
race,” this philosophy of accommodation, coupled with self-help, proved
extremely successful in certain, selected instances. Many southern
Whites, who were extremely resistant to any radical change in the status
of Blacks, found Washington’s views more palatable than those of other
world, saying what he knew that the white world wanted to hear, trying, like the trickster
John, to prevent that world from closing off what few possibilities there were for
effective action and achievement. . . . [Washington] . . . was a master at saying one thing
and meaning another, using techniques of indirection to subvert white American racism
even as he appeared to accommodate himself to the institutions of a racist society.” Id.
41
See August Meier, Negro Class Structure and Ideology in the Age of Booker T.
Washington, 23 PHYLON 258, 258 (1962) (describing Washington’s philosophy as being
that “[o]nce Negroes had proven their ability to help themselves, to acquire wealth and
respectability, it was believed, prejudice and discrimination would wither away”). Some
have argued that Washington was not an accommodationist, but a realist who used
trickery to help further progress among black people. See generally Gibson, supra note
35 (describing Washington’s autobiography UP FROM SLAVERY (1900) as deliberately
addressing white desire regarding racial matters and “assuag[ing] guilt in assuring its
white audience that blacks, in slavery and out, were utterly and entirely without
‘bitterness’”).
42
Randolph, supra note 31, at 152. These men tended to be members of the black
upper-class, some of whom “felt that their education and cultural upbringing, and not
race, would secure for them first class citizenship rights” and some of whom felt that an
accomodationist approach to resolving severe prejudices against Blacks “was far better
than no approach” at all. Randolph, supra note 31, at 152–53; see also GEORGE S.
SCHUYLER, BLACK AND CONSERVATIVE 4 (1966) (“My folks boasted of having been free
as far back as any them could or wanted to remember, and they haughtily looked down
upon those who had been in servitude. They neither cherished nor sang slave songs.”).
Cf. WILLARD B. GATEWOOD, ARISTOCRATS OF COLOR 302 (1993); see Meier, supra note
41, at 260 (stating that it was among the “upward mobile middle class [of Blacks during
the 1920s] that the philosophy of racial progress through economic solidarity . . . and the
philosophy of Booker T. Washington found their greatest support”). Although many of
Washington’s followers were from the black upper class, Washington’s philosophies, as
opposed to W.E.B. DuBois’s, are often viewed as designed to help the average black
man, and not just the Talented Tenth, as the most privileged Blacks were referred to by
Dubois, who believed that it would be this tenth that would help to raise the race.
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black leaders such as W.E.B. DuBois, and some even provided
Washington with the social and financial support to institute the programs
he saw as being most beneficial to Blacks.43 For example, with the
assistance of white philanthropists, in 1881, Washington founded the
Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute, which was created to train
Blacks to work in agricultures fields and, in part, as teachers.44
Washington’s beliefs were viewed as too conciliatory by many
Blacks, including W.E.B. DuBois,45 who lambasted Washington for not
forcing the white South to correct its wrongs through “candid and honest
criticism.”46 By 1911 and 1912, Washington’s power in the black
community had waned, and black resistance to his “conservative” ideas
had grown stronger.47
43

See Franklin, supra note 37 (asserting that Whites were more comfortable with
Washington’s approach because of its gradual nature); W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF
BLACK FOLK 16 (1903), reprinted by Vintage Books in 1986 (“It startled the Nation to
hear a Negro advocating such a programme after many decades of bitter complaint; it
startled and won the applause of the South. . . .”).
44
See WASHINGTON, STORY, supra note 35, at 79-82. This institution is now
known as Tuskegee University.
45
W.E.B. DuBois, a native of Massachusetts, received his many degrees from Fisk
University in Nashville, Tennessee, the University of Berlin in Germany, and Harvard
University. He was the first Black ever to receive his Ph.D in history from Harvard. See
Richard Delgado, Book Review, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African-American
Fortunes—Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
369, 379 (2002). DuBois, one of the founders of the NAACP, is famous for his prophetic
statement, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line,” which
continues to prove true in the twenty-first century. DUBOIS, supra note 43, at 16; Richard
Delgado, supra note at 379 (quoting DuBois and noting that DuBois founded the
NAACP in 1909); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal
Education in Shaping Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN . L. REV. 1981, 1999
(1993) (describing how even today society cannot escape the reality of the problem of the
color line); see also GLENN LOURY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 35 (1995)
(describing the parallels between the debates of followers of Washington and DuBois to
that of Justices Thomas and Marshall).
46
See DUBOIS, supra note 43, at 47.
47
See Bruce, supra note 40, at 245. Some Blacks had criticized Washington prior
to this time. For example, in 1904, Jesse Max Barber, a former editor of the Voice of the
Negro, satirized Washington when he wrote an article entitled “What Is A Good Negro?”
In response to this question, Barber wrote, “‘A good Negro’ is one who says that his race
does not need the higher learning; that what they need is industrial education, pure and
simple. He stands up before his people and murders the truth and the Kings English in
trying to enforce upon them the evils of a College Education and the beauties of the
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Despite this resistance, black conservatism endured past the postReconstruction period and into the very beginnings of the Civil Rights
Movement. The most dominant black conservative in between these two
important time periods (during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s) was George
Schuyler,48 a journalist who asserted that the “American Negro . . . has
been the outstanding example of American conservatism: adjustable,
resourceful, adaptable, patient, restrained, and not given to gambling what
advantages he has in quixotic adventures.”49 As Schuyler described in his
book Black and Conservative, conservatism continued to thrive among
many of the black elite, who “regarded [black Southern migrants] as
illiterate, ill-bred, and amoral” and unlike the “old Northern Negro
families [who] had the habits, traits, and outlook of the whites for whom
they worked and whose prejudices they shared.”50
By the 1950s, however, black conservatism began to change. As
opposed to focusing on maintaining a gradual approach to seeking
equality that was designed not to increase white resistance to black
equality, blacks conservatives, like Schuyler, began to focus solely on
principles of self-help and self-reliance by Blacks, not necessarily because
they would least irritate or upset Whites, but instead because they
believed that Whites would not act in the best interests of Blacks. As
Schuyler explained in his autobiography:
Once we accept the fact that there is, and will always be a
color caste system in the United States, and stop crying
about it, we can concentrate on how best to survive and
plow.” Quoted in Louis R. Harlan, Booker T. Washington and the Voice of the Negro,
1904–1907, 45 J. S. HISTORY 45, 50 (1979).
48
See Ann Rayson, George Schuyler: Paradox Among “Assimilationist” Writers,
12 BLACK AMER. LIT. F. 102, 104 (1978) (“In his autobiography, Schuyler expresses the
attitude of Booker T. Washington: ‘My feeling was then, and it is stronger now . . . that
Negroes have the best chance here in the United States if they will avail themselves of
the numerous opportunities they have.”). George Schuyler was born on February 25,
1895 and was raised in Syracuse, New York. Schuyler’s family was considered middle
class within the class system among Blacks. According to Schuyler, his “folks [were]
free black citizens of New York State” since the early 1800s. Oscar R. Williams, From
Black Liberal to Black Conservative: George Schuyler, 1923–1935, 21 AFRO-AMERS. IN
N.Y. LIFE & HISTORY 59 (1997).
49
SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 2 (emphasis added).
50
Id. at 4.
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prosper within that system. This is not defeatism but
realism.51
In the 1960s, the voice of black conservatives, as we traditionally
conceive of them, became weaker in light of the strength and
pervasiveness of the Black Power Movement.52 A few of these traditional
black conservatives, like Schuyler, however, continued to express their
views and denounced liberal black leaders for their “civil rights agitation,”
which, to their minds, simply created more enemies of the race and
resulted in no true gains for the people.53 Additionally, Schuyler rejected
the philosophies of black nationalists,54 such as Malcolm X, who
“opposed an integrationist understanding of racial progress”55 and whom
today’s black conservatives proudly claim as one of their own.56
51

Id. at 122.
Lewis A. Randolph, Black Neoconservatives in the United States, in RACE &
POLITICS 150–51 (James Jennings ed. 1997) [hereinafter Randolph, Black
Neoconservatives].
53
SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 342; see also Williams, supra note 48, at 59 (noting
that “Schuyler openly professed his beliefs during a time when conservative ideology
among African Americans did not have a widespread audience in mainstream America”
and “was a pioneer of 20th century black conservative ideology”). Cf. Mark Gavreau
Judge, Justice To George Schuyler, POL. REV., Aug. 2000, at 41 (“Schuyler’s dogmatic
conservatism ran in absolute contrast to philosophies expressed by virtually every major
spokesperson of the civil rights movement.”). Schuyler even went as far as to defend
police tactics that were utilized in response to marches and sit-ins, noting that the “use of
firehoses, tear gas, and dogs was cited with horror, as if these were not true and tried
methods of mob control the world over.” SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 346. He also
stated that he had “observed the police handling of the most recent Harlem riot and
[thought] the police restraint was admirable in the face of harsh provocation.” Id. at 34647. Schuyler believed that the Civil Rights Movement was communist-inspired and that
Communists were merely using Blacks to further their agenda. See Williams, supra note
48, at 59. Schuyler also opposed the selection of Martin Luther King, Jr. for the Nobel
Peace Prize. See Rayson, supra note 48, at 102 (also noting that Schuyler’s
“conservative views were so insistent that in 1964 he supported Barry Goldwater for
President despite what most blacks regarded as a racist Republican Party platform”).
54
See Spencer Overton, The Threat Diversity Poses to African Americans: A Black
Nationalist Critique of Outsider Ideology, 37 HOW. L.J. 465, 478-85 (1994) (discussing
the tenets of black nationalism).
55
Peller, supra note 36, at 761.
56
Juan Williams, A Question of Fairness, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 73
[hereinafter “Williams, Fairness”]. Many black conservatives have adopted Malcolm X
as a conservative today because of his philosophies were rooted in the principles of black
52

16

Despite Schuyler’s rejection of black nationalism, some black
nationalists, including those belonging to the Nation of Islam, actually
constituted a strong voice for black conservatism.57 Like Washington and
Schuyler, the Nation of Islam promoted the ideals of self-reliance and
self-determination and founded small black businesses and schools as a
means toward developing a separate society for Blacks.58 Indeed, it is no
surprise that Malcolm X, an adopted black conservative today, was once a
member of the Nation of Islam.59
In fact, to black conservatives during this time period, such as
Robert Woodson, who later worked at the National Urban League; the
now accepted Malcolm X, a black nationalist; and the Nation of Islam, the
welfare of Blacks rested in the hands of Blacks.60 As Malcolm X once
expressed during a speech, a favorite of Justice Thomas’s:
The American black man should be focusing his every
self-reliance. Cf. id. (quoting Clarence Thomas as saying “‘I don’t see how the civilrights people today can claim Malcolm X as one of their own. Where does he say black
people should go begging to the Labor Department for jobs? He was hell on
integrationists. Where does he say you should sacrifice your institutions to be next to
white people?’”).
57
See Hayward Farrar, Radical Rhetoric, Conservative Reality: The Nation of
Islam as an American Conservative Formation, in BLACK CONSERVATISM: ESSAYS IN
INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 109-29 (Peter Eisenstadt ed., 1999) (arguing
that, although the Nation of Islam is largely perceived as radical, it “has actually been a
conservative force in the black community”). Farrar also argues that Marcus Garvey,
who led the Back–To–Africa Movement, and his organization, the Universal Negro
Improvement Association, was a precursor to the Nation. See id. at 110 (asserting that
Garvey preached that, by created black-controlled social, economic, and political
structures, Blacks could achieve free themselves from white domination). Like the
Nation, Garvey was also heavily criticized by Schuyler. See SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at
122-24.
58
See Farrar, supra note 57, at 113-14, 127 (citing the Million March as an example
of the Nation’s conservatism with its focus on self-help). Of course, these are principles
also adopted by black liberals, only liberals also recognize how institutionalized barriers
make strict self-reliance difficult. See Richard Delgado, Book Review, Enormous
Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547,
1552-53 (1991) (noting that both black leftists and conservatives rely on principles of
individual agency and volition but that black conservatives emphasize such principles
more and that black liberals focus more on issues concerning social power and relations).
59
See Farrar, supra note 57, at 115-16.
60
SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 344. George Schuyler continued to express black
conservatism until he passed away in 1977. See Williams, supra note 48, at 59; see also .
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effort toward building his own businesses and decent
homes for himself. As other ethnic groups have done, let
the black people, wherever possible, however possible,
patronize their own kind, and start in those ways to build
up the black race’s ability to do for itself. That’s the only
way the American black man is ever going to get respect.61
In sum, to this new black conservative, it was Blacks alone, even in the
face of enormous discrimination and without the assistance of Whites,
who would control their own destiny.62 The issue for these conservatives
was black empowerment and black-self reliance.63
B. Today’s Black Conservatives
Like their predecessors, today’s black conservatives, such as
Justice Thomas, John McWhorter,64 Shelby Steele,65 Thomas Sowell,66
61

Quoted in Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 73.
See SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 352 (“There are forces in the world that want
us to fail and conspire toward that failure, which means disunity and destruction. We are
here blessed with the right of mobility, the right of ownership, the privilege of privacy
and development of personality, and the precious machinery of peaceful change. These
gifts and gains it is the purpose of the conservative to defend and extend, lest we perish in
the fell clutch of collectivism. These gifts and gains I have been trying in my small way
to preserve.”).
63
Reverend E.V. Hill, Black America Under the Reagan Administration, 34 POL.
REV. 30, 34 (1985).
64
John McWhorter, an associate professor of linguistics at the University of
California-Berkeley, is a Manhattan Institute Senior Fellow in Public Policy. He first
gained national prominence four years ago with the publication of LOSING THE RACE:
SELF–SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA (200)), in which he argued that black people’s
attachment to victimhood was a much greater hindrance to black advancement than
white racism. See John McWhorter, available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/mcwhorter.htm.
65
Shelby Steele, a graduate of Coe College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Southern
Illinois University, and the University of Utah, is a research fellow at the Hoover
Institution. At the Institute, Steele specializes in the study of race relations,
multiculturalism, and affirmative action. In 1990, he received the National Book
Critic’s Circle Award for his book THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION
OF RACE IN AMERICA. See Shelby Steele, Research Fellow, available at http://wwwhoover.stanford.edu/bios/steele.html.
66
Thomas Sowell, a graduate of Harvard University, Columbia University, and the
62
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and J.C. Watts,67 emphasize the principles of black empowerment through
self-reliance and self-help.68 Unlike their predecessors, however, today’s
black conservatives hold an even more prominent presence in the media
and among non-minority, American voters.69 During the 1980s, although
Blacks remained overwhelmingly loyal to the “liberal” Democratic Party
and to progressive ideologies, 70 the voice of the black conservative grew.
University of Chicago, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute in Stanford, California.
Prior to joining the Hoover Institute, Sowell was a professor at several institutions,
including Brandeis University and Cornell University. See Thomas Sowell, Rose and
Milton Friedman Senior Fellow on Public Policy, available at http://wwwhoover.stanford.edu/bios/sowell.html.
67
A former quarterback for the Oklahoma Sooners, Big Eight Champions in 1980
and 1981, J.C. Watts was elected to the United States Congress from the fourth district of
Oklahoma in 1994. In 1998, he became the first Black to serve in the House Republican
leadership when he was elected by his peers to serve as chairman of the Republican
Conference, which was the fourth-ranking leadership position in the majority party in the
United States House of Representatives, and a position once held by Dick Cheney, Jack
Kemp, and Gerald Ford. See The Honorable J.C. Watts, Jr., available at
http://www.gopac.com/gopac_about_bios.htm; see generally J.C. WATTS, JR., WHAT
COLOR IS A CONSERVATIVE? (2002).
68
See, e.g., STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 161 (“But,
while civil rights bills can be won [collectively], only the individual can achieve in
school, master a salable skill, open a business, become an accountant or engineer.
Despite our collective oppression, opportunities for development can finally be exploited
only by individuals.”). Again, slack liberals also emphasize these principles as well;
however, also recognizing that racism is also institutionalized, they contend that such
institutional factors may also prevented persons who have worked hard and persevered
through hard times. See Delgado, supra note 58, at 1548-49 (describing how critiques of
black liberals and conservatives converge on civil rights issues by “all finding serious
fault with (a) the racial status quo; and (b) the current system of civil rights laws and
policies by which that status quo is maintained and (sometimes) permitted to evolve”).
69
Willie Richardson & Gwen Richardson, Black Conservatives: The Undercounted,
in BLACK AND RIGHT: THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICA
44–45 (1997) (asserting that a larger portion of Blacks no longer align themselves with
liberal politicians and policies and the black conservative voice is becoming more
prominent).
70
See Edward Ashbee, The Republican Party and the African-American Vote Since
1964, in BLACK CONSERVATISM 233 (1999) (noting that the “black electorate has proved
the Democratic Party’s most loyal constituency”). Although many Blacks hold
conservative positions on issues such as abortion, Blacks have generally voted with the
“liberal” political party, which today is the Democratic Party. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra
note 31, at 91 (acknowledging that many Blacks are socially conservative on issues of
abortion and crime).
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Due to a variety of factors, including matters such as the emergence of
the black middle and upper middle class, more Blacks began to identify
with conservative values and openly join the Republican Party.71
Still, many individuals in the black community remained and
continue to remain skeptical about the politics of black conservatives.72
In contrast to liberal ideology, which is centered on the belief that
government should play an active role in addressing the imbalances in
power, wealth, and privilege among Whites and minorities, anti-statist
conservative ideology involves a strong resistance to governmental
interference in domestic policy affairs, interference which, to the minds of
many Blacks, is what facilitated minority advancement in society.73 Thus,
as one author has noted, “a black critic speaking with the backing of the
political and intellectual right bears a difficult burden of showing that he
is not a tool of forces hostile to his own people.”74
This task is daunting, given widely held perceptions among black
liberals and other liberals that black conservatives are mere pawns of the
Republican Party.75 A careful review of literature authored by many of
today’s black conservatives, however, lays some foundation for
addressing this challenge. In particular, books and articles from selfidentified black conservatives, such as McWhorter and Steele, expose
several significant differences between the most dominant themes of
“black conservative ideology” and “white conservative ideology,” which
in turn helps to disprove the idea that black conservatives are the “tools”
71

See Randolph, Black Neoconservatives, supra note 52, at 152–53. Some authors
have asserted that more than 30% of Blacks identify themselves as “conservative.” See,
e.g., EARL OFARI HUTCHINSON, THE CRISIS IN BLACK AND BLACK 10 (1997); see also
Richardson & Richardson, supra note 69, at 43.
72
See Bridgeman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 8, on file with the author)
(asserting that “‘authentic blackness’ has an anti-conservative political bent”).
73
See Joan Biskupic, Thomas Caught Up in Conflict; Jurist’s Court Rulings, Life
Experience Are at Odds, Many Blacks Say, WASH. POST, June 7, 1996, at A20 (noting
that Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School has described the Supreme Court as
“the ultimate place that black people had been able to go to to vindicate their rights”)
74
Hill, supra note 63, at 28 (quotations omitted); see also Peter Beinart, Wedded,
NEW REPUB., Apr. 5, 2004, at 8 (noting “black suspicion of the Republican Party”);
Smith & Walton, Jr., supra note 30, at 215 (arguing that black conservatives are clients of
the Republican Party).
75
See Kennedy, supra note 12 (manuscript at 28, on file with author) (describing
how Justice Thomas has been viewed as a pawn because of his substantive positions on
issues of race).
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of their white counterparts.
1. Core Principles of Black Conservative Thought
Although both black and white conservatives share many basic
philosophies of conservatism, such as the belief in less involvement by the
federal government in economic and social welfare matters, a greater
emphasis on individual responsibility, and more authority and control
within local and state governments, they diverge in important respects on
the basis and reasoning for their positions on particular issues, such as
affirmative action.76 The core principles of black conservative thought
consist of two key concepts: (1) an emphasis on the departure from black
“victimology”;77 (2) the promotion of self-reliance and the elimination of
dependency by Blacks on Whites or the government, which is believed to
go to the heart of what black conservatives view as the problems
underlying unemployment, crime, and poverty in the black community.78
To many black conservatives, such as Shelby Steele, the low status
of Blacks in the United States is the result of a system of black
76

DOLBEARE & METCALF, supra note 31, at 151–61; see also STEELE, A DREAM
DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 8 (“The liberal–conservative axis is a bit different for blacks
than for Americans generally. Under his American identity a black Republican is
conservative, but under his racial identity he may be quite liberal . . . . But the ‘new’
black conservatives––the ones who recently become so controversial––may even be
liberal by their American identity but are definitely conservative by the terms of their
group identity. It is their dissent from the explanation of black group authority that
brings them the ‘black conservative’ imprimatur. Without this dissent, we may have a
black Republican but not a ‘black conservative,’ as the term has come to be used.”).
77
See MCWHORTER, supra note 64, at xi (defining the cult of victimology as “a
keystone of cultural blackness to treat victimhood not as a problem to be solved but as an
identity to be nurtured”); STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 10 (“[A] black
conservative is a black who dissents from the victimization explanation of black fate
when it is offered as a totalism–when it is made the main theme of group politics.”);
WATTS, supra note 67, at 35 (asserting that Jesse Jackson’s phrase “‘I am somebody’ has
become ‘I am somebody’s victim’” and that Watts rejects this “fashionable ‘cult of
victimology’”); see also STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at ix
(noting that Blacks have been taught to be “seen primarily as racial victims”).
78
See Hill, supra note 63, at 29 (quoting Clarence Thomas as saying “the key to
black progress must come from within the black community”). But see Randolph, Black
Neoconservatives, supra note 52, at 154 (arguing that the “Black neoconservative call for
self-reliance is inconsistent with their extensive dependency on funding from White
conservative sources”).
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dependency on the white establishment and a lack of self-reliance and
empowerment. According to today’s black conservatives, these two
factors, combined with black victimology (meaning the perception of
Blacks as victims only), keep Blacks in a subordinate position because it
leaves Blacks in “the odd and self-defeating position in which taking
responsibility for bettering [themselves] feels like a surrender to white
power.”79
Additionally, contrary to popular belief, black conservatives do
not deny the existence of racism and its effects on Blacks, but instead
refuse to focus their energies on past and current injustices to the race. To
their minds, they are not accommodationists or sell-outs, but realists. For
example, as George Schuyler explained in his biography,
A black person learns very early that his color is a
disadvantage in a world of white folk. . . . . I learned very
early in life that I was colored but from the beginning this
fact did not distress, restrain, or overburden me. One takes
things as they are, lives with them, and tries to turn them
to one’s advantage or seeks another locale where the
opportunities are more favorable.
This was the
conservative viewpoint of my parents and family. It has
been mine through life.80
In support of this view that realism, self-help, and self-reliance are the
best means for resolving issues of poverty, substandard education, lack of
power, and devastating crime in the black community,81 black
conservatives often point to the long history of Blacks who overcame
obstacles to achieve their goals, even during the post-Reconstruction and
Jim Crow eras.82
79

See STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 15 (arguing that
racial victimization cannot be the real problem if “[r]esidents feel less safe, drug
trafficking is far worse, crimes by blacks against blacks are more frequent, housing
remains substandard, and teenage pregnancy has skyrocketed” since the 1960s).
80
SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 2 (emphasis added).
81
See Sherri Beth Smith, Contemporary Black Conservative Rhetoric: An Analysis
of Strategies and Themes 3 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State
University) (on file with the Pennsylvania State University Library).
82
Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at xi. See, e.g., JOHN MCWHORTER, AUTHENTICALLY
BLACK 141 (2003) (describing several black public schools that regularly produced
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The final theme throughout black conservative thought is the
belief that “the most effective [and] lasting changes” in society occur
slowly, or its corollary, the belief that “quick fixes,” which black
conservatives contend are too often supported by black and white liberals,
serve as a temporary band-aid to the real and serious problems ailing
Blacks.83 Indeed, what is most interesting about black conservative
thought is that its central tenets are premised on a belief that white
America has created an addiction for Blacks to victimology and
dependency without any real concern for addressing the problems
underlying black oppression.84 In other words, a key component to black
conservative ideology is a certain “distrust” of Whites—even the
conservative Whites with whom black conservatives work.
Furthermore, this “distrust” is only fueled by the isolation and
exclusion that black conservatives can and do encounter in white
conservative circles. As a general matter, many black conservatives
acknowledge that the larger conservative community does not have the
best interests of the black community in mind. As Thomas explained
himself in an article he wrote regarding the loneliness of a black
conservative:
Ph.D’s and other prominent figures between the late 1800s and 1950s); Telly Lovelace,
No Need For A Government Handout, in BLACK AND RIGHT: THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF
BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICA 47 (1997) (noting the successes of Blacks during
the antebellum period and thereafter); Thomas Sowell, Black Excellence: The Case of
Dunbar High School, 35 PUB. INTEREST 3, 4 (Spring 1974).
83
Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at 83; see also Calmore, supra note 21, at 193
(describing the principal tenets of black conservatism as including “touting a rugged
American individualism, translating it into black personal responsibility and self help;
viewing race as abstracted and disconnected from group identity; limiting rights holders
to individuals rather than groups; endorsing race neutral laws and public policies;
dissenting from ‘civil rights professionals;’ preaching ‘compassionate conservatism’ or
‘tough love;’ favoring market-oriented reform (free markets and entrepreneurship) with
little state regulation; discounting the operational significance of race and the importance
of racism as one of black America’s most fundamental problems; emphasizing the need
to reverse black moral decline, crime, poverty, and family dysfunction (welfare
dependency); and opposing abortion”).
84
Angela Katrina Lewis, African-American Conservatism: A Longitudinal and
Comparative Study 4 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee)
(on file with the University of Tennessee Library) (noting that black conservatives
believe that government programs have caused the “deterioration of Black families” and
have created “a sense of dependency among African-Americans”).
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It often seemed that to be accepted within conservative
ranks and to be treated with some degree of acceptance, a
black was required to become a caricature of sorts,
providing sideshows of anti-black quips and attacks. But
there was more–much more–to our concerns than merely
attacking previous policies and so-called black leaders.
The future, not the past, was to be influenced. It is not
surprising, with these attitudes, that there was a general
refusal to listen to the opinions of black conservatives. In
fact, it often appeared that our white counterparts actually
hid from our advice. There was a general sense that we
were being avoided and circumvented. It seemed that
those of us who had been identified as black conservatives
were in a rather odd position.85
Additionally, Justice Thomas proclaimed the following about the “wellmeaning” of white liberals, stating:
“[I]t doesn’t matter that black and white Americans are
unlikely to ever see each other as anything other but
blacks and whites. It doesn’t matter that a black man in
America is only rarely judged on the basis of character
rather than his color. . . . For when you get right down to
it . . . successful blacks don’t particularly like the kind of
integration that whites have crafted for them in the past
thirty years. Increasing numbers of middle-class blacks
see integration simple as window dressing; blacks may be
present and visible, but only a few have any real power.86
85

Thomas, supra note 30, at 9 (emphasis added). In fact, Thomas has expressed
frustration with certain decisions made during his tenure in the Reagan administration.
For example, in describing the administration’s decision to support a tax exemption for
Bob Jones University in 1982, Thomas explained, “I expressed grave concerns in a
previously scheduled meeting that this would be the undoing of those of us in the
administration who had hoped for an opportunity to expand the thinking of, and about,
black Americans. A fellow member of the administration said rather glibly that, in two
days, the furor over Bob Jones would end. I responded that we had sounded our death
knell with that decision. Unfortunately, I was more right than he was.” Id.
86
Quoted in Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 72; see also Stuart
DeVeaux, Young, Black, and Republican, in BLACK AND RIGHT: THE BOLD NEW VOICE
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In essence, unlike their white conservative counterparts, many black
conservatives do not believe that a colorblind society is, practically
speaking, attainable.87 Rather, they believe that Blacks must learn to do
for and rely on themselves alone, not only because they are black but also
because Blacks cannot and should not expect Whites to act in their best
interests.88
In fact, all of the previously described concepts are reflected in
black conservative stances on certain political and social issues. The
remainder of this Part details how the core principles of abandoning black
victimology, encouraging self-reliance and self-help, and focusing on
lasting and permanent change reveal themselves in black conservative
thought on issues of education and desegregation, affirmative action, and
crime, subjects I address later in my analysis of Justice Thomas’s
jurisprudence.
2.

Education and Desegregation

One of the focal points of black conservative thought on education
is the failure of the public school system to educate black youth in a
OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICA 24 (1997) (“[T]he social problems that are
destroying the black community (breakdown of the family, crime, education, lack of
economic initiative, poverty, and welfare) grew out of thirty years of a well-meaning
Democrat-controlled Congress. Despites these failures, Democrats have not given up
their poor solutions. . . . Of course, those Democrats do not live with the consequences.
They don’t live in inner cities. Their neighbors are not drug lords and trigger-happy
gangsters.”).
87
Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 72 (“I don’t care how
educated you are, how good you are at what you do––you’ll never have the same contacts
or opportunities, you’ll never be seen as equal to whites.”). Cf. Hill, supra note 63, at 34
(quoting Clarence Thomas, who asserted, “I don’t think this society has ever been colorblind”).
88
See LOURY, supra note 45, at 35 (asserting that Blacks are mistaken in placing
responsibility “on the shoulders of those who do not have an abiding interest in such
matters”); cf. Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at xi (“Most black conservatives are antiUtopian, less interested in constructing an ideal society, than in getting by in the society
in which they find themselves. . . . Black conservatives have recognized the truth in this
proposition, and they have often rejected the abstract plans to ‘remake the world’ on
behalf of blacks. One accepts the present with the conviction and hope that things will
get better.”).
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manner that allows them to compete, based on traditional criteria, with
their white peers. All around the country, black conservatives have
expressed intense criticisms of the educational agenda and goals that have
been set for black children in public schools and have articulated
arguments for alternatives to resolving the disparities between the
performances of black and white students in schools and on standardized
tests.89
Chief among these criticisms is a denouncement of the
integrationist ideal that was advanced by the NAACP and civil rights
activists during the late 1950s and 1960s.90 For today’s black
conservatives, this ideal was damaging to the advancement of Blacks in
education, not because integration itself was a harmful goal, but because
too much emphasis was placed on that goal as opposed to the objective of
actually improving the learning conditions of black children and the
quality of their education.91
Indeed, in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement, some black
conservatives, such as Robert Woodson, broke with the Movement on the
issue of desegregation and forced busing, asserting that “[t]he issue was
black empowerment, not integration, which should be an individual
matter, not one of public policy.”92 Furthermore, to black conservatives,
such as Woodson, the focus on integration not only withdrew attention
from the poor quality of education that was available to individual black
students, but it also taught Blacks that they should not want to live near
each other or attend school together.93
89

See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Dems, GOPers, and Blacks II, JEWISH WORLD REV.,
Oct. 2, 2000 (arguing that Blacks are “more likely to gain from vouchers that would
enable them to pull their children out of failing public schools”), available at
http://www.jewishworldreview.com.
90
Some liberals have made similar criticisms, including Derrick Bell, whose new
book Silent Covenants critiques civil rights leaders for their misguided approach in
believing that integration alone would solve the problems of unequal education for black
children. See SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (reviewing Silent Covenants).
91
See WATTS, supra note 67, at 208 (declaring that “[a]ffirmative action isn’t the
problem . . . . Lousy education for black kids is the problem”).
92
Hill, supra note 63, at 30.
93
See id. DuBois also made this point in W.E. Burghardt DuBois, Does the Negro
Need Separate Schools, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 330 (1935) (“As it is today, American
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As Malcolm X, who is often described as conservative by many
black conservatives today, once expressed:
I just can’t see where if white people can go to a white
classroom and there are no Negroes present and it
doesn’t affect the academic diet they’re receiving, then I
don’t see where an all-black classroom can be affected
by the absence of white children. . . .So, what the
integrationists, in my opinion, are saying, when they say
that whites and blacks must go to school together, is that
the whites are so much superior that just their presence in
a black classroom balances it out.94
In sum, for many black conservatives then and now, the fight was not for
integration or against segregation that was by choice,95 but against
segregation that was state-mandated. 96
Negroes almost universally disparage their own schools. They look down upon them;
they often treat the Negro teachers in them with contempt; they refuse to work for their
adequate support; and they refuse to join public movements to increase their
efficiency.”).
94
MALCOLM X, BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS AND A
LETTER 16-17 (G. Breitman ed. 1970).
95
As several authors have noted, however, such ideology neglects the realities of
residential segregation, much of which is influenced by discriminatory real estate
practices. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 19 (1997). Furthermore, even when people, especially
minorities, have chosen to live in particular area for racial reasons, such decision may
have been based primarily on a desire to escape the reality racism within one’s own
neighborhood as opposed to a rejection of integration. See ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A
PRIVILEGED CLASS 188 (1993) (“The pain of [black] professionals . . . is more often than
not rooted in feelings of exclusion. In attempting to escape that pain, some blacks end up,
in effect, inviting increased isolation. When the successful black lawyer declares that he
will ‘go to my own people for acceptance’ because he no longer expects approbation
from whites, he is not only expressing solidarity with other members of his race, he is
also conceding defeat. He is saying that he is giving up hope of ever being anything but a
talented ‘nigger’ to many of his white colleagues, that he refuses to invest emotionally in
those who will never quite see him as one of them, whatever his personal and
professional attributes.”).
96
In response to a question regarding how Proposition 54, a 2003 initiative to ban
the collection of race data by the state, could negatively affect integration efforts in the
public schools in California, black conservative Ward Connerly once answered, “I don’t
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Indeed, some black conservatives viewed the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,97 which ordered the end of all state-mandated
segregation, as insulting. For example, Zora Neale Hurston, who is most
famous for her book Their Eyes Were Watching God, once exclaimed:
The whole matter revolves around the self-respect of my
people. How much satisfaction can I get from a court order
for somebody to associate with me who does not wish me
near them? I regard the ruling of the United States
Supreme Court as insulting, rather than honoring my race.
98

Others such as Ward Connerly have gone farther, once stating in response
to a question about his opinion of Senator Trent Lott, “Supporting
segregation need not be racist. One can believe in segregation and believe
in equality of the races.”99 For the most part, however, black
conservatives simply believe that, when the emphasis is placed on
diversity in schools as opposed to strengthening the schools in
predominantly black neighborhoods, it is black children who always lose
out and gain nothing.
3. Affirmative Action
Of all pressing social issues today, black conservatives have
care whether they are segregated or not. . . kids need to be learning, and I place more
value on these kids getting educated than I do on whether we have some racial balancing
or not.” Editorial, Initiative Could Hurt Integration, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2003, at A16.
The initiative, which Connerly drafted, was defeated by voters in a near 2-to-1 margin
(with 5,071,565 votes (63.9%) against the initiative and 2,868,976 (36.1%) for the
initiative) in the October gubernatorial-recall election that resulted in Arnold
Schwarzenegger’s becoming Governor of California. See Steve Miller, Affirmative
Action Backers Push for Connerly’s Ouster, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003.
97
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
98
JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY xxvii (2001); see also STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR
CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 165 (“There is no magic that will make development
happen. We [Blacks] simply have to want more for ourselves, be willing to work for it,
and not use our enemy––old or new––as an excuse not to pursue it. It doesn’t really
matter that Southern accents in Southern airports make me remember. What’s important
is that I can travel.”).
99
Interview on Wolf Blitzer Reports (CNN broadcast Dec. 13, 2002).
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received the most attention from the media and public on the debate
regarding race-based affirmative action.100 For example, in 1996, Ward
Connerly, a member of the University of California Board of Regents and
President of the American Civil Rights Institute, drew national attention to
black conservative thought when he successfully headed the California
Civil Rights Initiative, also known as Proposition 209, an initiative that
banned the consideration of race in education, employment, and
contracting for all state institutions.101
Although many black conservatives today agree that the
discrimination that Blacks have faced and still face should be included in
the discussion of how to address inequities in education, they disagree as
to whether the short-term solution of race-based affirmative action is an

100

By “affirmative action,” I refer to the act of extending preferential treatment to
underrepresented racial minorities in hiring and recruitment. See Anupam Chander,
Minorities, Shareholders, and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 120 n.3 (2003) (defining
affirmative action “as minority-mindfulness in decisionmaking resulting in . . . a
preference”); West, supra note 26, at 614 (describing affirmative action as a “program or
policy where race, national origin, or gender is taken into account”).
101
The University of California-Berkeley Office of Student Research reports
that Proposition 209 has resulted in severe drops in black, Chicano, Latino, and
Native American enrollment in the University of California’s top schools and
graduate schools. According to the office, in the fall of 2003 first-year undergraduate
class, only 211 (4.2%) black, 430 (8.5%) Chicano, 161 (3.2%) Latino, and 25 (0.5%)
Native American students registered as first-years at the University of CaliforniaBerkeley (out of 8,796 applicants). See UC Berkeley Undergraduate Fact Sheet—Fall
2003, available at
http://osr4.berkeley.edu/Public/STUDENT.DATA/PUBLICATIONS/
UG/ugf03.html#table%207. In the fall of 1996, before the end of affirmative action,
324 (5.7%) black, 517 (10.3%) Chicano, 218, (4.3%) Latino, and 68 (1.4%) Native
American students registered at as first years at the University of California-Berkeley.
See Berkeley Undergraduate Fact Sheet-Fall 1996, available at
http://osr4.berkeley.edu/Public/STUDENT.DATA/PUBLICATIONS/FACT.SHEET/f
act96.pdf; see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Race-Based Affirmative Action in
American Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 446 (2001) (reporting that, after
the passage of Proposition 209, “[b]lack enrollment [at UC-Berkeley] dropped 95
percent, with just one black in the law class entering in 1997[,] Hispanic enrollment
dropped 50 percent, and Native American 100 percent”); Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the
Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: The Tension of Separatism and
Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multicultural Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 863
(1993) (noting that there has been a backlash against affirmative action since the
1980s).
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appropriate way to address these inequities.102 To them, much like the
focus on an integrative ideal, affirmative action does not ultimately help
Blacks, but works only to hinder them.103 The dominant black
conservative view is that “racial preferences allow society to leapfrog
over the difficult problem of developing blacks to parity with whites and
into a cosmetic diversity that covers the blemish of disparity”104 when the
real focus should be on a demand for parity between Blacks and
Whites.105 In other words, according to black conservative ideology,
racial diversity is not tantamount to racial development for black people in
education106 because all it does is allow Whites to create a picture of the
ideal of diversity on campus by recruiting black and brown faces without
regard to their actual learning and progress in classes and on tests.107 To
102

See, e.g., STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 5 (“Certainly no
explanation of black difficulties would be remotely accurate were it to ignore racial
victimization. On the other hand, victimization does not in fact explain the entire fate of
blacks in America, nor does it entirely explain their difficulties today.”).
103
See STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 115 (emphasis
added) (“But the essential problem with this form of affirmative action is the way it leaps
over the hard business of developing a formerly oppressed people to the point where they
can achieve proportionate representation on their own (given equal opportunity) and goes
straight for the proportionate representation. This may satisfy whites of their innocence
and some blacks of their power, but it does very little to truly uplift blacks.”).
104
Id. at 116; see also Hill, supra note 63, at 31 (quoting Glenn Loury as stating
that “[i]t will sound paradoxical to many people that affirmative action is not in the
interests of blacks” but “in the longer term, preferential treatment is inconsistent with the
attainment of fully equal status in society as independent contributors respected for their
contribution by their fellow citizens”).
105
See STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 31 (“To have more collegeeducated minorities [people readily accept the idea] we don’t need to work at instilling
the principle of intellectual excellence, or at raising the standards in inner-city schools, or
at making minority neighborhoods safe for children. (In fact, we allow license and
lowered standards to prevail in these areas.) . . . . A group preference in college
admissions is a simple and impersonal intervention by which we can manufacture a
wonderfully “diverse” campus––even when black students average three hundred SAT
points below whites and Asians, as has been the case at the University of California at
Berkeley.”); STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 121–24 (arguing
that “preferential treatment does not teach skills, or educate, or instill motivation”).
106
STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 116.
107
See STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 33; STEELE, CONTENT OF
OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 147 (“Black students have not sufficiently helped
themselves, and universities, despite all their concessions, have not really done much for
blacks. If both faced their anxieties, I think they would see the same things: academic
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the black conservative, affirmative action only sets up “unprepared”
minority students for failure.108
In contending with affirmative action, Black conservatives also
focus on what they refer to as the demoralizing effect of the policy on
Blacks––the feeling of inferiority by black students about their ability to
compete with their white peers.109 According to black conservatives, this
effect, combined with the cultural myth of black inferiority, is devastating
parity with all other groups should be the overriding mission of black students, and it
should also be the first goal that universities have for their black students. Blacks can
only know they are as good as others when they are, in fact, as good––when their grades
are higher and their dropout rate lower. Nothing under the sun will substitute for this,
and no amount of concessions will bring it about.”).
108
See MCWHORTER, supra note 82, at 141 (“The Bakke decision has taught a
generation of young Americans that black students are more important for their presence
in promotional brochure photographs than for their scholastic qualifications. . . . This
ultimately perpetuates the very underperformance that has made the fig-leaf ‘diversity’
notion necessary.”); THOMAS SOWELL, A PERSONAL ODYSSEY 182–87 (2000) (describing
his experiences as an economics professor at Cornell University where he witnessed
black students with lower test scores struggle with their academic work). Of course, such
arguments lose their force if one challenges the legitimacy of traditional standards of
merit, such as standardized tests that correlate with wealth, and not necessarily with
performance. See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the
Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 214-24 (2003) (detailing upper
middle-class bias in admissions and asserting that “[q]uantative measures often reflect
family resources and influence rather than a student’s resourcefulness or intelligence”);
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 969 (1996) (indicating that standardized tests do
not identify qualities important for the education the test takers seek); see also Richard
Lempert, David Chambers, & Terry Adams, Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice:
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 401-02, 459-63, 492503 (2000) (same).
109
STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 116. Many
beneficiaries of affirmative action, however, do not suffer the same stigma as Thomas
did. As several scholars have argued, any stigma outweighs the negatives. See Laura M.
Padilla, Intersectionality and Positionality: Situating Women of Color in the Affirmative
Action Dialogue, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 880 (1997) (“Furthermore, any stigmaattached downside to affirmative action does not outweigh the upside of providing
opportunities for women of color that would not otherwise exist.”). Moreover, many
supporters of affirmative note that Blacks have been stigmatized since the founding of
this country. See Eva Jefferson Patterson, Affirmative Action and the California Civil
Wrongs Initiative, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 327, 334 (1997) (“‘Stigmatize [us], give
[us] that degree.’ [It’s not] [a]s though if you don’t have the Berkeley degree you’re not
stigmatized as a black person.”).
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to black students110 because it encourages reliance on Whites as opposed
to self-reliance.
Additionally, black conservatives believe that affirmative action
creates a perverse incentive to remain a victim, especially to middle class
and upper middle class Blacks, who are then presented with a motivation
either to underperform or not to push themselves because of the fear of
losing their “advantage” in the admissions game.111 Furthermore, they
contend that affirmative action unfairly helps the black middle class,112
whom they do view as not experiencing any serious disadvantage,113 and
not helping poor Blacks, who have a stronger need for affirmative
action.114 In sum, for the black conservative, the real focus should be on
economic disadvantage.115
110

See id. at 134 (“So when a black student enters college, the myth of inferiority
compounds the normal anxiousness over whether he or she will be good enough.”).
111
Id. at 119.
112
See STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 126-27 (noting that “[w]hen
the University of California was forced to drop race-based affirmative action, a study was
done to see if a needs-based policy would bring in a similar number of blacks” and
discovered that “the top quartile of black American students–often from two-parent
families with six-figure incomes and private school educations–is frequently not
competitive with whites and Asians even from lower quartiles”).
113
STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 142 (noting that “the
real challenge is not simply to include a certain number of blacks, but to end
discrimination against all blacks and to offer special help to those with talent who have
also been economically deprived”); see WATTS, supra note 67, at 206 (arguing for classbased affirmative action).
114
See STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 139 (“Of course
poor and working-class blacks do not get preferences . . . because preferences go almost
exclusively to the wealthiest and best-educated blacks.”).
115
See Armstrong Williams, Supreme Court Hands Down Affirmative Action
Decision, June 23, 2003, available at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/
Armstrongwilliams/aw20030623.shtml (“These are the people affirmative action needs
to be helping - those poor minority students who are conditioned to believe that they have
no chance at achieving the American dream. By the time these kids reach high school it is
too late for them to take advantage of affirmative action because they have already given
up.”). Such a position, however, ignores the fact that, when wealth is defined in terms
broader than just income alone, including assets, prestige of job and education level
required for job, savings, retirement, and so on, Blacks and Latinos are far from being in
the same position as Whites. See generally MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY 100-110 (1995)
(asserting that when factors other than income are included, black families are
significantly worse off than white families with similar incomes); see also R. Richard

32

Finally, black conservatives oppose affirmative action because
they believe that it stigmatizes Blacks in the eyes of Whites by reinforcing
stereotypes of Blacks as inferior and less intelligent than Whites.116 To
them, the program simply feeds the flame as opposed to extinguishing
it.117
Underlying all of these views on affirmative action is the black
conservative’s belief that white liberals support affirmative action while
believing Blacks to be truly incompetent and then “sneer at the idea that
affirmative action stigmatize[s] women and minorities as incompetent.”118
In the eyes of black conservatives, the liberal bias in favor of racial
preferences is based on and continues to exist only because of an
inference of black inferiority. In essence, in black conservative thought,
the hypocrisy of white liberals is in the idea that they would not ask their
own child to accept the benefits of affirmative action in place of concrete
improvement in test scores and grades.119 As former Professor Shelby
Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College
Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 167 (2001) (pointing out that “middle-class blacks
hold dramatically less wealth than whites with comparable education and income” and
that “[l]ow socioeconomic status whites, as measured by education and income, have a
wealth-holding comparable to middle class blacks”).
116
Id. at 120. George Schuyler once expressed a similar argument in relation to his
opposition of the NAACP’s boycott of white-owned stores in Harlem in 1934. The
boycott was based on the slogan “Don’t buy where you can’t work.” In attacking the
boycott, Schuyler asserted the following:
The Negro, characteristically enough, is unprepared for it. . . . An
insistence upon employment on a racial basis alone will be re-echoed
with avidity by jobless whites and professional Anglo-Saxons. The
color bar in industry hits the Negro hard enough without him laboring
to make his lot worse. . . . [T]he boycott ballyhooers are clearly
asking us to cut off our heads to cure a cold.
Williams, supra note 48, at 59 (quoting George Schuyler, To Boycott or Not to Boycott: A
Deadly Boomerang, THE CRISIS, Sept. 1934, at 260).
117
As Professor Shelby Steele has argued, “Much of the ‘subtle’ discrimination
that blacks talk about is often (not always) discrimination against the stigma of
questionable competence that affirmative action delivers to blacks.” STEELE, CONTENT
OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 141.
118
STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 5.
119
See id. at 20 (“Would he [a white journalist] have encouraged his own children
to overcome a deficit by looking for a preference? Did he think a preference built esteem
or undermined it?”).
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Steele once mocked, “[T]he liberal who has high expectations for his or
her own children often feels that he or she cannot ‘push the issue’ with
blacks.”120 Moreover, black conservatives contend that such “preferences .
. . give up on black excellence in order to preserve white excellence.”121
After all, “[i]f black equality were truly the goal, wouldn’t policy focus on
educational development before college?”122 In sum, black conservatives
view affirmative action as not truly helping to resolve the problems that
cause black underperformance in schools and on standardized tests, and
only assuaging the guilt of liberal Whites.123
4.

Crime

Like their white counterparts, black conservatives strongly
advocate toughness on criminals and strict law abidance without
significant regard to mitigating factors.124 Unlike their white counterparts,
however, whose focus is on accountability and recognizing the harm to
victims, black conservatives place a strong emphasis on punishing
criminals not just because it protects victims, but specifically because they
believe it protects black victims. 125 Moreover, for black conservatives,
harsh punishment of criminals is critical to the advancement of Blacks not
only because it would better protect Blacks, (who remain especially
vulnerable to criminal wrongdoing and corruption because of a lack of
financial resources and weak police protections),126 but also because it
120

See id. at 34.
See id. at 160; see also Hill, supra note 63, at 41 (quoting Thomas as asserting
“[w]hite parents tell their kids to study hard and get into college, and black kids are told
they don’t have to worry about their SAT scores”).
122
See id. at 33.
123
See Richard Delgado, supra note 58 at 1548-49 (describing Steele’s description
of racial programs, such as affirmative action, as programs that enable Whites to feel
good about themselves while actually doing little for Blacks).
124
See Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? “Gangsta” Culture, Clarence Thomas, and
Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 327 (2000) (discussing the response of
some black conservatives to crime and policies on crime).
125
Although not a self-identified conservative, Randall Kennedy has expressed
views on criminal matters that are more in line with black conservatism. See, e.g.,
Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1994) (arguing that there has been a failure to protect black
communities).
126
See Kennedy, supra note 125, at 1256.
121
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would serve as a method for distancing “good” Blacks from the negative
stereotypes that are used to support police brutality, racial discrimination
in law enforcement, and racial profiling.127
This central tenet of black conservative thought on crime first began
to emerge during the antebellum period when free Blacks, who tended to
be more conservative,128 viewed their survival and the maintenance of
their status (however low it was) as dependent upon distinguishing
themselves from enslaved Blacks.129 This attitude even extended into the
post-bellum period when there was no need for such distinctions to be
made between free Blacks and slaves. For example, these “politics of
distinction”130 played themselves out in the Davis Bend Court, an old
slave court in Mississippi.131 This slave court was created by Joseph
Davis, a slave master who owned and ran a plantation on the banks of the
Mississippi and later helped to found the Mississippi Bar Association.
Called the “Hall of Justice,” the slave court was in session every Saturday
with Davis, with a jury of slaves issuing judgments after hearing and
receiving evidence at trial.132
In one session on the court after the
127

Randall Kennedy, A Response To Professor Cole’s “Paradox of Race and
Crime,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2573, 2574-75 (1995) (describing support of some black members
of Congress for harsh sentences to deter crack usage); Glenn C. Loury, Listen to the
Black Community, PUB. INT., Fall 1994, at 33, 35-36 (encouraging blacks to promote
punishment of lawbreakers).
128
Randolph, supra note 31, at 151.
129
See generally Hanes Walton, Jr., Blacks and Conservative Political Movements,
37 Q. REV. OF HIGHER ED. AMONG NEGROES (1969). See also PETER J. RACHLEFF,
BLACK LABOR IN THE SOUTH: RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 1865–1890 (1984); MICHAEL B.
CHESSON, RICHMOND AFTER THE WAR (1981).
130
This phrase was coined by Professor Regina Austin, who defined the phrase as
highlighting “the difference that exists between the ‘better’ elements of and the
stereotypical ‘lowlifes’ who richly merit the bad reputations the dominant society accords
them.” Regina Austin, The Black Community, Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1772 (1992). Professor Austin opposed such
distinctions in the black community.
131
See Katherine Franke, Subjects of Freedom (unpublished manuscript at 72-73,
on file with author) (citing Freedmen’s Court, Davis Bend, Record Court of Freedmen,
Davis Bend, Miss., RG 105, Entry 2153, NA); see also JANET SHARP HERMANN, THE
PURSUIT OF A DREAM 6, 62-64 (1981).
132
See Franke, supra note 131 (unpublished manuscript at 60-62, on file with
author) (citing VARINA HOWELL DAVIS, JEFFERSON DAVIS: EX-PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, A MEMOIR 1, 49-50, 174 (1890)). Davis intervened
“only to grant a pardon if he regarded the sentence as too severe. Id.

35

emancipation of slaves, a “judge” of the Davis Bend Court of Freedom, a
rare court of colored men which continued to render decisions on crimes
committed by newly freed slaves,133 emphasized the “politics of
distinction” while chastising a mother who had been charged with stealing
a bag of corn:
Now you listen, you. You and your mother are a couple of
low-down darkies, trying to get a living without work.
You are the cause that respectable colored people are
slandered, and called thieving and lazy niggers.134
Such politics of distinctions have continued today, as noted above, with
black conservatives urging an emphasis on distinguishing law-breaking
Blacks with those who are law-abiding.135
In addition to viewing a hard stance against crime as a means of
distinguishing law-abiding Blacks from black criminals, black
conservatives also regard such a stance as necessary for ensuring the
protection of the persons who are often left out of debates concerning race
and the criminal justice system: black victims of crime.136 As opposed to
analyzing how some Blacks may turn to crime as a reaction to poverty and
133

See id. (unpublished manuscript at 72, on file with author) On July 4, 1863,
Admiral David Porter, commander of the Union fleet on the Mississippi, ordered that
Davis Bend be made an independent colony for freed slaves. The former slaves who
resided at Davis Bend when Davis was the slave master continued the court system. The
court system was formally established in January of 1865 and consisted of three judges,
who were elected every three months, and who tried all the cases that were brought
before them. See id. (citing Freedmen’s Court, Davis Bend, Record Court of Freedmen,
Davis Bend, Miss., RG 105, Entry 2153, NA).
134
Id. (citing JOHN T. TROWBRIDGE, THE SOUTH: A TOUR OF ITS BATTLE-FIELDS
AND RUINED CITIES, A JOURNEY THROUGH THE DESOLATED STATES, AND TALKS WITH
THE PEOPLE 383 (1866)).
135
Randolph, supra note 31, at 153 (quoting WILLARD B. GATEWOOD,
ARISTOCRATS OF COLOR (1993)). Basically, like Washington’s philosophy during the
post-Reconstruction period, during the antebellum and post-bellum period, some of the
black elite, who were primarily “conservative,” believed that “if it were not for the
behavior of the masses, the better class of whites would extend to the black elite the full
privileges of citizenship.” See id.
136
See Thomas Sowell, Easy Justice (August 12, 2003) (arguing that “[innocent
victims of crime seem to disappear from the lofty vision and ringing rhetoric of those
who worry that the punishment of criminals is ‘too severe’”), available at
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20030812.shtml.
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institutionalized racism, black conservative ideology focuses on the black
victim, noting how Blacks are much more vulnerable to violent and nonviolent crimes than Whites.137 To the black conservative, the fact that
most poor Blacks never turn to crime and that Blacks are seven times
more likely to be murdered, four times more likely to be raped, three times
more likely to be robbed, and twice more likely to be assaulted than
Whites dictates that Blacks be nothing but harsh on criminals.138
According to black conservative thought, the effects of such crime
137

See Brian W. Jones, Two Visions of Black Leadership, in BLACK AND RIGHT:
THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICA 41 (1997) (criticizing
liberal black leaders for concentrating procedural protections for the accused and
rationalizing the “victimizer’s behavior with arguments about racism and economic
determination”).
138
See Thomas Sowell, “Friends” of Blacks: Part II, JEWISH WORLD REV. (Sept.
6, 2000), available at http://www.jewishworldreview.com. At the same time, the fact
that Blacks are more likely to be victims of crime than Whites does not necessarily mean
that harsher punishment will benefit the community. In fact, it could exacerbate the
problem. As Professor Davis Cole has argued:
Even if one were willing, in the name of the “politics of distinction,”
to write off the black lawbreakers, the impact extends to the black
community at large. Incarceration of so many young black men
contributes to the very problems that are so often pointed to as the
source of higher crime rates in the black community. More than 30%
of black families have incomes below the poverty level, as compared
with 9% of white families. Minorities’ median net worth is less than
7% that of whites. Unemployment among African-Americans is about
twice that among whites. More than half of all African-American
children are living only with their mothers, as compared with 14% of
white children. By removing so many black men from the community
and stigmatizing them forever with a criminal conviction, criminal law
enforcement is likely to mean more single-parent families, less adult
supervision of children, more unemployed and unemployable members
of the community, more poverty, and in turn, more drugs, more crime,
and more violence. This is not to minimize the burden that criminals
themselves present to the community. It is simply to suggest that
incarceration—especially on such a massive scale in a well-defined
community—is far from an adequate solution, and may well
exacerbate the problems associated with crack and crime.
Davis Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy’s
“Politics of Distinction,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2558 (1995) (also noting that “[b]lack
citizens living in the inner city are disproportionately victimized by crime, but they are
also disproportionately victimized by law enforcement”).
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to the members of these communities are incredibly devastating, often
leaving innocent, law-abiding black citizens as prisoners in their own
homes and resulting in severe economic consequences, such as higher
insurance rates, higher prices for goods in black communities with costly
security devices, and the dearth of stores, banks, and other financial
institutions in black communities.139 As black conservatives dictate,
Blacks must demand that their communities be made safe and secure
through the strict enforcement of laws that penalize criminals instead of
coddling them.
Indeed, black conservatives have linked this concept with their
support of the death penalty, again emphasizing the “politics of
distinction” by claiming that the “real victims” in capital cases are lawabiding members of the black community, who are denied equal
protection under the law of the death penalty because persons who kill
Whites are significantly more likely than those who kill Blacks to receive
the death penalty.140 Furthermore, in capital cases, black conservatives
advocate not allowing jurors discretion in deciding the fate of such
defendants on the ground that this discretion only allows racism to
determine who receives a life sentence and who receives a death sentence.
To black conservatives, the only way to protect individual black
139

See Sowell, supra note 136 (criticizing Justice Kennedy for his condemnation of
mandatory sentencing laws and noting that “[i]f a day in prison can be pretty long, so can
every day living in a high-crime neighborhood, where you have to wonder what is going
to happen to your son or daughter on the way to or from school”); Hill, supra note 63, at
37.
Clarence Thomas once argued the following in an interview:
The sections where the poorest people live aren’t really livable. If
people can’t go to school, or rear their families, or go to church
without being mugged, how much progress can you expect in a
community? Would you do business in a community that looks like an
armed camp, where the only people who inhabit the streets after dark
are the criminals. . . . If you want to encourage business in these areas
then stopping crime has got to be at the top of the list.
Quoted in Hill, supra note 63, at 37.
140
See Randall Kennedy, McKleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1421-43 (1988). In McKleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987), a study revealed that “even after taking account of 39 nonracial
variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to
receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.” Id. at 287.
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defendants charged with murder is by eliminating such discretion so that
all criminals are treated and judged the same.141 In essence, they oppose
placing too much authority in the hands of individuals in criminal matters
because, to their minds, in such instances, individual Blacks will always
suffer because of racism, whether conscious or unconscious.142 In sum,
for black conservatives, the emphasis should be placed on protecting lawabiding Blacks through the “politics of distinction” and strict law
enforcement. Additionally, for black conservatives, black liberals’
support of discretion in considering mitigating social factors should be
stopped because, contrary to what black liberals think, such discretion
only harms black defendants by opening them to racism, instead of
resulting in juror recognition of the effects of racism and life
circumstances for each individual.
II. BIRTH OF A “NATIONALIST”: HOW CLARENCE THOMAS BECAME
BLACK AND RIGHT
There is nothing you can do to get past black skin.
— Clarence Thomas143

The evolution of Clarence Thomas into a black conservative, or as
141

Of course, such reasons ignore the racism that precedes a capital trial, including
police targeting of black persons and the discretion of prosecutors in determining who
will be charged with what crime, and if that charged crime should be a capital offense.
See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 26-33 (1998) (discussing how racism, both unconscious and
conscious, results in discriminatory treatment of Blacks by police and prosecutors);
Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1660, 1674-84 (1996) (same); Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and
Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 830 (1990) (noting that “[p]rosecutors make subjective
decisions, based on a complex variety of factors, about whether to seek the death
penalty”); see also Cole, supra note 138, at 2566 (“Racial stereotypes are likely to
influence the police officer’s decision about whom to watch or stop, the prosecutor’s
decision about which charges to pursue, the judge’s decision about whether to set bail,
the jury’s decision to convict, the judge’s sentence, and the parole board’s decision on
early release.”).
142
Such views are in line with black conservative views on other issues, such as
affirmative action, which rest on the idea that the only way for Blacks to ensure fairness
is to eliminate “subjective” decisionmaking from the process.
143
Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 72.

39

some would argue, the ultimate cultural dissenter,144 provides one of the
most interesting chronicles of racial identity development in United
States. Sociologists and psychologists have long studied the construction
of race in society and its impact on an individual’s identity.145 In 1994,
Michael Omi and Howard Winant introduced racial formation theory,
which refers to the “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are
created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”146 Specifically, this
theory provides that race is not a fixed term, but is instead an evolving set
of social meanings that are formed and transformed under a constantly
shifting society.147 In essence, supporters of this school argue that race is
a social factor.148
Prior to Omi and Winant’s work, several psychologists examined
the means through which individuals socially develop their racial
identity,149 in particular black identity. William Cross, professor of
psychology at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, was among the
first to examine the psychological development of black identity in 1971.
In so doing, Cross outlined a process he termed “nigrescence,” which is
the pattern through which individuals become “Black” in terms of one’s
manner of thinking about and evaluating oneself and one’s reference
144

Sunder, supra note 30, at 497 n.6 (citing Maureen Dowd, Liberties; Black and
White, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at A31, in which Justice Clarence Thomas is quoted as
saying “‘the war in which we are engaged is cultural, not civil’”); see also Smith &
Walton, Jr., supra note 30, at 215 (stating that “[c]onservatives in black America are
dissenters from the mainstream left/liberal ideological consensus that characterizes the
community”).
145
See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (exploring
theories of racial formation).
146
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994).
147
OMI & WINANT, supra note 146, at 55.
148
See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 210 (1996) (“Identity ascription may be performed by the
self or by others. And identity is always contextual.”); see also Frank Rudy Cooper,
Cultural Context Matters: Articulations, Identities and Terry’s Seesaw Effect, 71
U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 355, 369-70 (2002) (same).
149
See JANET E. HELMS, BLACK AND WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY: THEORY,
RESEARCH AND, PRACTICE 3 (Janet E. Helm ed. 1990) (stating that “the term ‘racial
identity’ actually refers to a sense of group or collective identity based on one’s
perception that he or she shares a common racial heritage with a particular racial group”).
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group.150 Scholars, such as Janet Helms, professor of counseling
psychology and director of The Institute for the Study and Promotion of
Race and Culture at Boston College, have expounded upon Professor
Cross’s theory of racial identity development.151 As Professor Helms
explains in her book, Black and White Racial Identity: Theory, Research
and, Practice, the impact of racial identity on any particular individual is
complex. Within any racial group, “various kinds of racial identity can
exist, and consequently, racial consciousness per se usually is not
considered to be dichotomous, present, or absent, but rather is
polytomous.”152
Indeed, the rise in the number of black conservatives in today’s
society displays exactly the varied nature of black racial identity and
consciousness. On a more specific note, the mere existence of Clarence
Thomas, one of the most prominent members of the Black Right, reflects
exactly how a person who strongly identifies as a black153 can cultivate
values and beliefs in ways that differ from the vast majority of members in
his or her racial group.154
In fact, despite Justice Thomas’s conservative views, which some
have argued are antithetical to black identity,155 there is no doubt that his
150

See WILLIAM CROSS, SHADES OF BLACK: DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN
IDENTITY (1991); William E. Cross, Jr. & Peony Fhagen-Smith, Patterns of African
American Identity Development: A Life Span Perspective, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 243 (2001) (Charmaine L. Wiejeyesinghe & Bailey W.
Jackson eds.) (noting that “nigrescence” means “‘to become black’”).
151
Professor Janet Helms was among the first academics to study the development
of white racial identity. See generally HELMS, supra note 149.
152
HELMS, supra note 149, at 7. David Demo and Michael Hughes also expounded
upon Cross’s work on black identity, arguing that black identity is a multidimensional
concept that encompasses a wide array of feelings, including closeness to other Blacks
and a commitment to African and African-American culture.” David Demo & Michael
Hughes, Socialization and Racial Identity Among Black Americans, 53 SOC. PYSCH. Q.
364–74 (1990).
153
Thomas, supra note 30, at 9 (asserting that “policies affecting black Americans
had been an all-consuming interest of [his] since the age of sixteen”).
154
Cf. WATTS, supra note 67, at 248 (asking “[w]hy can’t a black man or woman
espouse a more conservative viewpoint . . . and still ‘reflect the African-American
community’”).
155
See, e.g., Jack E. White, Uncle Tom Justice, TIME, June 26, 1995, at 36
(asserting that no “true” black person would hold Justice Thomas’s views); see also
Smith, supra note 7, at 528 (claiming that some persons have argued that Justice Thomas
is not a “real” black man).
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life has been marred by racism, racial hierarchy, and economic inequality.
More important, it is clear, as Justice Thomas has expressed himself, that
race and racism have played a significant role in shaping his persona.156
A brief recounting of part of his life story demonstrates as much, in the
particular the manner in which he arguably may have progressed through
the stages of nigrescence, as developed by Professor Cross and other black
scholars such as Professor Beverly Daniel Tatum.157 Professor Cross’s
nigrescence model involves five stages of racial identity development: (1)
pre-encounter, (2) encounter, (3) immersion, (4) internalization, and (5)
internalization-commitment.158
156

Indeed, Justice Thomas himself has described the importance of racial
experiences in the development of his ideology, noting that, at certain points, his
“attitudes approached black nationalism” and citing leaders such as Malcolm X, Richard
Wright, Frederick Douglass, and Booker T. Washington as some of his heroes. See
Clarence Thomas, Interview with Bill Kaufman, REASON ONLINE, available at
www.reason.com/cthomasint.shtml.
157
The nigrescence model has been criticized for various reasons, , including its
tendency to simply the development of racial identity as a simple process of
increasing racial identification and its identification of an emotionally health racial
identity for Blacks as being one that centered around Afrocentrism. See Camille Gear
Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future
of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1174-75 (2004). Nevertheless, I briefly discuss
this model because it is the most well-known of the racial identity development
models.
158
BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER
IN THE CAFETERIA? AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 76 (1997) (highlighting
the five stages of nigrescence and extending it to cover a youth in their phases of racial
identity development); Cross & Fhagen-Smith, supra note 150, at 244 (same); see also
Bailey W. Jackson III, Black Identity Development: Further Analysis and Elaboration, in
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 15-16 (2001) (Charmaine L.
Wiejeyesinghe & Bailey W. Jackson eds.) (describing the stages of black identity
development as being naïve or absence of social consciousness or identity; acceptance,
meaning acceptance of the perceived worth of black people and black culture; resistance
or the rejection of prevailing white culture’s description and valuing of black people;
redefinition or the renaming, reaffirming, and reclaiming of one’s sense of blackness,
black culture, and racial identity; and internalization, meaning the integration of redefined
racial identity into aspects of one’s identity).
During the first stage, the pre-encounter stage, the black individual views the world
from a white frame of reference and internalizes many of the beliefs and values of the
dominant white culture, including the idea that whiteness is superior. In this stage, the
black individual has not yet recognized the societal significance of his or her membership
in a racial group. See TATUM, supra note 158, at 76. Under the nigrescence model, an
individual graduates to the second stage, the encounter stage, when an event or series of
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As noted earlier, one could argue that Justice Thomas has gone
through each of the stages of nigrescence throughout his life. Thomas
began his life poor and destitute in the segregated town of Pin Point,
Georgia in 1949. When Thomas was two years old, his father abandoned
him, his brother, and his mother who was pregnant with her third child, a
girl. In 1954, the same year that Brown v. Board of Education159 was
decided, Thomas started first grade at the segregated Haven Home School.
In 1955, because Thomas’s mother could no longer afford to raise
and keep all of her children, Thomas and his brother went to live (without
their sister) with their grandfather, Myers Anderson (“Anderson”), and
their grandmother Christine Anderson in Savannah, Georgia.160 Although
events causes that individual to acknowledge the personal impact of racism. In this stage,
the individual begins to struggle with the idea of what it means to be a member of a group
targeted by racism. See TATUM, supra note 158, at 76; see also Cross & Fhagen-Smith,
supra note 150, at 244 (describing this stage as depicting “the event or series of events
that challenge and destabilize ongoing identity).
During the third stage, the immersion stage, the black individual begins to unlearn
the negative stereotypes about Blacks in the United States and starts to develop a positive
sense of self. This development is often accompanied with anger from the individual
regarding racism by Whites and a strong desire to surround oneself with symbols of racial
identity. During this stage, a black individual is engaged in self-discovery, actively seeks
out knowledge about his or her own racial and cultural history, and unlearns many of the
negative stereotypes that were internalized during the pre-encounter stage. Eventually,
the individual’s anger is subsided in the fourth stage of development, internalization,
where the individual develops a sense of security about his or her own racial identity.
See id.; see also Cross & Fhagen-Smith, supra note 150, at 244 (describing the stage as
signaling “the habituation, stabilization, and finalization of the new sense of self”). As
this stage progresses, the individual begins to establish meaningful relationships across
boundaries, including with Whites. Finally, in the fifth stage, internalizationcommitment, which is described as being minimally distinct from the fourth stage, the
black individual is anchored in a positive sense of racial identity. More importantly, he or
she has discovered methods for transforming his or her “sense of identity into ongoing
action expressing a sense of commitment to the concerns of Blacks as a group.” See
TATUM, supra note 158, at 76; see also Cross & Fhagen-Smith, supra note 150, at 244
(describing a person in the fifth stage as achieving “a strong Black identity at the
personal level” and then “join[ing] with others in the community for long-term struggles
to solve Black problems and to research, protect, and propagate Black history and Black
culture”).
159
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
160
See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 30-31; see also Nomination of Clarence Thomas
to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 108 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of
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barely able to read and write himself, Anderson was a strong supporter of
education and managed to earn enough money to send Thomas to an allblack Catholic school.161
It was in these Catholic schools and a Catholic seminary that
Thomas arguably entered into the first two stages of nigrescence, the preencounter and encounter stages. When Thomas reached the tenth grade,
he began to attend an all-white Catholic boarding school called St. John
Vianney Minor Seminary and, for the first time, experienced “culture
shock.”162 Thomas once described his first day at the all-white school,
saying “When I walked in there and saw I was in a room with all these
white kids, I just about died.”163
Despite having to adjust to a strange, all-white environment,
Thomas excelled as a student and an athlete at St. John Vianney.164 His
social successes at the school, however, were far more limited, primarily
because of racism. Thomas’s white classmates at St. John Vianney
repeatedly teased him, at times telling him, “Smile, Clarence, so we can

Clarence Thomas) (“Our mother only earned $20 every two weeks as a maid, not enough
to take care of us. So she arranged for us to live with our grandparents later, in 1955.
Imagine, if you will, two little boys with all their belongings in two grocery bags.”). As
Thomas has repeatedly stated, he gained the morals and values that have served as the
foundation for his success in the Anderson household. Although lacking formal
education, Anderson, who, unlike many Blacks at that time, had built and owned his own
house, was also a strong proponent of self-reliance. See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 32;
see also Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Cotenant
Possession Value Liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 331,
334 (1994) (noting that “it was remarkable that [her] grandmother had had any property
at all; a divorced, Black woman who’d raised three daughters alone in the segregated
South with not even a high school education”).
161
Like his grandfather and grandmother, who raised Thomas in their home, Justice
Thomas is now raising his great-nephew Mark. Justice Thomas assumed custody over
Mark after his father was convicted of drug charges in 1997. See GREENYA, supra note
5, at 16; Tony Mauro, Decade After Confirmation, Thomas Becoming a Force on High
Court, FULTON CTY. DAILY REPORT, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1.
162
Quoted in Alvin Wyman Walker, The Conundrum of Clarence Thomas: An
Attempt at a Psychodramatic Understanding, RACEANDHISTORY.COM, at
www.raceandhistory.com/historicalviews/clarencethomas.htm.
163
Quoted in Alvin Wyman Walker, The Conundrum of Clarence Thomas: An
Attempt at a Psychodramatic Understanding, RACEANDHISTORY.COM, at
www.raceandhistory.com/historicalviews/clarencethomas.htm.
164
Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74.
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see you.”165 For Thomas, who had been ridiculed as a child for his
“nigger naps” and routinely called “America’s Blackest Child,”166 the
taunts were painful.167 During his tenure at St. John Vianney, Thomas
entered what he has described as a “self-hate” stage,168 going to great
lengths to fit in with his white classmates and internalizing racism.169 At
the same time, Thomas seemed to enter into what can be described as the
second stage of nigrescence, encounter, where such series of taunts and
racial events caused him to recognize fully the impact of racism. Indeed,
ultimately Thomas’s efforts to gain acceptance from his classmates would
be of no avail, and Thomas would eventually come to believe that “there
is nothing a black man can do to be accepted by whites.”170
At Immaculate Conception Seminary in Missouri, where Thomas
enrolled after high school to become a priest, he continued through what
could be defined as the encounter stage, struggling with the idea of what it
means to be Black and thus a constant target of racism. In fact, Thomas’s
stay at the seminary, would be brief as result of this struggle with targeted
racism, with Thomas leaving soon after hearing a white classmate and
future priest declare the following about the shooting of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.: “Good, I hope the son of a bitch dies.”171 According to Thomas,
after overhearing this statement, he “knew [he] couldn’t stay in that socalled Christian environment any longer.”172
As Thomas pursued his education at Holy Cross College in
165

See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 44.
See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74. Since the
antebellum period, there has been serious intraracial discrimination among Blacks based
upon skin tone. See generally MIDGE WILSON ET AL., THE COLOR COMPLEX (1993); see
also Trina Jones, Shades of Brown, The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1515-22
(2000) (detailing the history of colorism within the black community).
167
See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74.
168
Id.
169
See id.
170
Quoted in Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74.
171
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 48. As a general matter, Thomas felt that the Church
was ignoring critical issues of race. As Thomas once explained of his departure from the
seminary, “dogs were being sicced on blacks . . . and the church was focusing on what
songs to play at services.” Hill, supra note 63, at 28 (quotations omitted).
172
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 48-49 (explaining that “[t]his was a man of God,
mortally stricken by an assassin’s bullet, and one preparing for the priesthood had wished
evil on him”). As Thomas would explain many years later, the day Martin Luther King,
Jr. was shot was a “demarcation between hope and hopelessness” for him. Id.
166
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Worcester, Massachusetts,173 he arguably moved into the third stage of
nigrescence, immersion, where he began to unlearn negative stereotypes
about Blacks, developed anger about racism by Whites, and surrounded
himself with symbols of racial identity.174 Indeed, at Holy Cross, Thomas
embraced Black Nationalism,175 helped to found the Black Student Union,
and became involved with programs sponsored by the Black Panthers,176
such as its free breakfast programs for black children. Thomas also led a
walkout at Holy Cross over the issue of divestment from South Africa,
which at that time had a system of apartheid.177
173

Thomas attended Holy Cross with the assistance of a Martin Luther King
Scholarship that was aimed at attracting more high-achieving black students to the
college. See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 54 (stating that in the late 1960s, Holy Cross
“pushed to find and admit more black students under a relatively new policy known as
affirmative action”).
174
See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74.
175
Black Nationalism is a complex set of beliefs emphasizing the need for the
cultural, political, and economic separation of African Americans from white society.
The Black Nationalist movement, which can be traced back to Marcus Garvey’s
Universal Negro Improvement Association of the 1920s, sought to acquire economic
power and to infuse among Blacks a sense of community and group feeling. As an
alternative to being assimilated by the American nation, which is predominantly white,
black nationalists sought to maintain and promote their separate identity as a people of
black ancestry. See Farrar, supra note 57, at 110-14.
176
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 57. The Black Panther Party was a radical, black
political organization that was founded by Huey P. Newton in 1966 with friends, Bobby
Seale and David Hilliard. The Party outlined a Ten Point Platform and Program, which
called for a redress of the longstanding grievances of the black masses in America,
including full employment for all black people, overdue payment of forty acres and two
mules, decent housing, decent education that teaches black children of their history, free
health care, an end to police brutality, freedom of all blacks from government
correctional facilities, and assurance of trials by a jury of actual peers for all Blacks. See
Cynthia Deitle Leonardatos, California’s Attempt to Disarm the Black Panthers, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 956-60 (1999).
According to Thomas, he was so militant, “[He] thought George McGovern was a
conservative.” Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Supreme Discomfort, WASH. POST,
Aug. 4, 2002, at 23. Although Thomas considered himself liberal and a militant during
his days at Holy Cross, he was the sole dissenter to a proposal for a black dormitory/hall
on campus. Thomas eventually decided to live in the black dormitory/hall, but brought
his white roommate from the previous year to live with him. GREENYA, supra note 5, at
60 (noting that Thomas dissented in part “‘because he didn’t want to make it easy for
whites to avoid him’”).
177
Apartheid, which means “apartness,” is the name given to a policy of
segregation by race in South Africa that began in 1948, but the policy itself extends back
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Just as Thomas had done in primary and secondary school, he
excelled in his classes at Holy Cross. In spite of his academic successes,
however, Thomas was not a vocal participant in the classroom. As
Thomas would later explain, he did not voluntarily speak in the classroom
in high school, college, and later law school because of the discomfort he
felt as a result of his childhood speech.178 As Thomas explained, he had
grown up in a rural area of the South where there remained a major
influence of Gullah, a mixture of English and African language.179 As a
consequence, while he learned to speak standard English, he would edit
his speech and his words before speaking, which resulted in his doing
more listening than speaking.180
After graduating ninth in his class from Holy Cross, Thomas
attended Yale Law School. At Yale, Thomas’s militancy began to
dwindle, and his opposition to affirmative action policies, particularly
quotas, began to grow. 181 Thomas felt stigmatized by what he believed to
to the beginning of white settlement in South Africa in 1652. After the primarily
Afrikaner Nationalists came to power in 1948, the social custom of apartheid was
systematized under law and remained in practice until 1994 . See NANCY L. CLARK &
WILLIAM H. WORGER, SOUTH AFRICA: THE RISE AND FALL OF APARTHEID 3-6 (2004);
see also Lisa R. Pruitt, No Black Names on the Letterhead? Efficient Discrimination and
the South African Legal Profession, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 545 (2002) (describing certain
after-effects of apartheid in the legal profession for black and colored lawyers). In 1994,
the first multiracial elections occurred in South Africa, with an electoral victory for the
Africa National Congress. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Book Review, Towards
Democracy in a New South Africa, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 689, 691-92 (1995). Prior to
that, there were global efforts to force the abolition of apartheid in South Africa,
including those directed toward divestment of South African securities. See Joel C.
Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of “South African” Securities, 65
NEB. L. REV. 209, (1986) (arguing that trustees should divest “to reach the goal of
political, social, racial, and economic justice for all of South Africa” and that they could
do so without violating their fiduciary duty to the trust).
178
See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 20, 56 (“One reason for my being inconspicuous
was that I had difficulty speaking proper English. . . . I would think about the right way
to phrase a question while I was trying to say it, and trip over myself. Some people
thought I had a stuttering problem. So I remained quiet.”).
179
See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 20, 56 (describing Thomas’s stated reasons for
his silence on the bench); see also KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 3 (2004) (describing Gullah culture).
180
See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 20, 56; see also Scott D. Gerber, “My Rookie
Years Are Over” Clarence Thomas After Ten Years, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 343, 349-50 (2002).
181
See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75 (detailing an
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be his white classmates’ view that black law students at Yale were not
there because of their academic qualifications, but merely to fulfill a
quota.182 As Thomas later explained about his days at Yale, “You had to
prove yourself every day because the presumption was that you were
dumb and didn’t deserve to be there on merit.” 183 Indeed, Thomas felt so
stigmatized by what he perceived as his classmates’ opinions that he
avoided classes in civil rights and constitutional law, instead opting to
take tax law, corporate, and antitrust law,184 to prove his abilities.185
interview with Thomas, in which he described his feelings at Yale).
182
See id.
183
Quoted in GREENYA, supra note 5, at 68, 94 (stating that Thomas described his
experience as being one in which “every time [he] walked into a law class at Yale it was
like having a monkey jump down [his] back from the Gothic arches”). Additionally, as
Thomas saw it, at Yale, affirmative action primarily assisted only middle class blacks, not
the masses. According to Thomas, most of the Blacks who graduated from Yale were the
children of black lawyers, doctors, and teachers. See Williams, A Question of Fairness,
supra note 56, at 75 (“Man, quotas are for the black middle class. But look at what’s
happening to the masses. Those are my people. They are just where they were before
any of these policies.”); Neil A. Lewis, Thomas’s Journey on Path of Self-Help, N.Y.
Times, July 6, 1991 (noting that at Yale, Thomas was “usually attired in bib overalls and
a dark wool watch cap, as if to announce he was a man of the common folk”); see also
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 68 (same).
184
See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75 (noting that Thomas
purposefully avoided civil rights classes). As Professor Dorothy Brown has shown,
however, even tax law is affected by race. See Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the
Twenty-First Century: What’s Tax Policy Got to Do with It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 759, 760-68 (1999) (analyzing how certain tax statutes have a disparate impact
based on race). The same holds true for corporate law. See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, A Trip
Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder Voice and Management
Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 738-48 (2003) (discussing the lack of diversity
among corporate directors and the executive officers they appoint and how diversity
would contribute to better management decision making and greater shareholder wealth).
185
See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75 (describing
Thomas’s comments that he shunned civil rights courses because he did not want to be
viewed as a student who was admitted and must be coddled because he is black). To this
today, Justice Thomas holds on to this belief. The Justice once advised a young black
male from a housing project, who planned to attend Brown University, to avoid “classes
and orientation on race relations.” He explained to the youth, “What I look for in hiring
my clerks–the cream of the crop–I look for the math and sciences, real classes, none of
that Afro-American study stuff. If they’d taken that stuff as an undergraduate, I don’t
want them.” Quoted in Calmore, supra note 21, at 212–13 (quoting David G. Savage,
Justice Thomas Defined by His Roots, and Distance from Them–Though Jurist Hails
from a Humble Background, He Refuses to Let His Experiences Influence His Court
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Upon his graduation from Yale, one of the country’s most elite law
schools, in 1974, Thomas found himself jobless. He had been rejected by
every law firm in Atlanta.186 None of the law firms were hiring black law
school graduates as attorneys, even if they graduated from Yale Law
School.187 It was at this point that one could argue Thomas entered the
fourth stage of nigrescence, internalization, where he began to develop a
sense of security about his racial identity and began to establish
meaningful relationships across racial boundaries, with perhaps the most
important being one with John Danforth, a Yale alumnus and then the
Republican Attorney General of Missouri, who hired Thomas to serve as
counsel for the state department of revenue and the tax commission.188
In 1975, Thomas furthered his break with the black left as he
discovered the work of Thomas Sowell, a black conservative
economist.189 In 1980, Thomas would enter what seemed to be the last
and final stage of nigrescence, internalization-commitment, after being
invited by Sowell to the Fairmont Conference in San Francisco,
California, a conference for black conservatives who were seeking “an
alternative to the consistently leftist thinking of the civil rights leadership
and the general black leadership.”190 At this conference, Thomas found
his home, thereby beginning his entrenchment in the Republican Party and
developing an ideology and course of action for addressing his concerns
about the plight of individuals in the black community.191
Decisions, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1998, at A5).
186
See Stephen Henderson, Clarence Thomas Urges UGA Law Graduates to
Persevere, MACON TELEGRAPH, May 18, 2003, at 1; see also GREENYA, supra note 5, at
70 (quoting Thomas as saying “‘Prospective employers dismissed our grades and
diplomas . . . assuming we got both primarily because of preferential treatment”).
According to Justice Thomas, he still possesses the rejection letters from law firms in
Atlanta. See id.
187
See Henderson, supra note 186, at 1.
188
See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75.
189
See Thomas, supra note 30, at 5.
190
Id.
191
Id.; GREENYA, supra note 5, at 89 (stating that “Sowell’s main thesis of black
self-sufficiency and avoidance . . . of ‘victimization mentality’ resonated deeply within
the still-young Clarence Thomas”). Thomas described his experience at and after the
conference as both uplifting and depressing. He stated, “For those of us who had
wandered in the desert of political and ideological alienation, we had found a home, we
had found each other. For me, this was also the beginning of public exposure that would
change my life and raise my blood pressure and anxiety level. After returning from San
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In 1981, Ronald Reagan appointed Thomas to serve as the
assistant secretary for the Civil Rights Division in the Department of
Education.192 According to Thomas, he “initially resisted and declined
taking the position of assistant secretary for civil rights simply because
[his] career was not in civil rights and [he] had no intention of moving
into th[e] area.”193 Although Thomas was sure that his appointment was
due to his race, he ultimately decided to accept the position upon
persuasion from friends.194 According to Thomas, during his tenure as
assistant secretary, he held “strategy meetings among blacks who were
interested in approaching the problems of minorities and who were willing
to admit error and redirect their energies in a positive way.”195
After spending only ten months in the position at the Department
of Education, Thomas was then promoted to become the Chair of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).196 The Reagan
Administration’s failure to view Thomas as anything other than a black
man, however, became clear upon the confirmation to a second term as
Chairman of the EEOC. At the confirmation, the then-Assistant Attorney
General Brad Reynolds toasted Thomas, declaring that Thomas was “the
epitome of the right kind of affirmative action working the right way.” 197
On July 11, 1989, the first President Bush nominated Clarence
Thomas to the United States Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit.198 Less
than two years later, on July 1, 1991, President Bush then nominated
Judge Clarence Thomas to succeed Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall,
who had just resigned from the Supreme Court days before.199 Former
Francisco, the Washington Post printed a major op-ed article about me and my views
presented at the ‘Fairmont Conference.’ Essentially, the article listed my opposition to
affirmative action as well as my concerns about welfare. The resulting outcry was
consistently negative.” Thomas, supra note 30, at 6.
192
See GREENYA, supra note 6, at 90.
193
Thomas, supra note 30, at 6; see also Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra
note 56, at 75.
194
See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 90; see also ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS,
CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 186 (2001).
195
Thomas, supra note 30, at 6.
196
See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 90.
197
Quoted in Merida & Fletcher, supra note 176, at 24; see also GREENYA, supra
note 5, at 127.
198
See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 149.
199
See Evelyn Wilson, Comment, Comments On “An Open Letter to Justice
Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague,” 20 S. U. L. REV. 141, 141 (1993).
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President Bush asserted that Thomas was “the best qualified person for
the job on the merits”200 behind snickers that Thomas’s lack of judicial
experience and his law school record hardly made him qualified for the
job.201
Although an overall majority of Blacks supported Clarence
Thomas’s nomination to the Court,202 his nomination caused an uproar
among some prominent feminist and minority civil rights groups,203
200

Quoted in Justice Clarence Thomas, A Classic Example of an Affirmative Action
Baby, J. BLACKS HIGHER. EDUC., Jan., 31, 1998, at 36; see also GREENYA, supra note 5,
at 171 (stating that President Bush was supposed to refer to Judge Thomas as the “best
man” for the job instead of the “best qualified”). Many of Thomas’s critics contend that
his appointment to the bench was the result of “affirmative action.” For example, at the
time of Thomas’s appointment, Democratic Senator Joseph Biden stated, “Had Thomas
been white, he never would have been nominated. The only reason he is on the Court is
because he is black.” Id.; see also Edward Lazarus, Making Sense of Thomas’ Cross
Burning Remarks and First Amendment Law (noting “that Thomas’s qualifications,
compared to those of other potential candidates, were limited”), available at
www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/26/findlaw.analysis.lazarus.thomas.
201
See Maureen Dowd, Could Thomas Be Right?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at 25
(mocking that “Thomas was nominated by the first President Bush with the preposterous
claim that he was the ‘best qualified’ man for the job”); Christopher Edley Jr., Doubting
Thomas: Law, Politics and Hypocrisy, WASH. POST, July 7, 1991, at B1(arguing that
Thomas professionally less distinguished than all the Justices except Kennedy and
Souter).
202
Polls showed that anywhere from 50% to 70% of Blacks supported Thomas’s
nomination. See Peggy Peterman, Most Blacks Glad Thomas Confirmed, Now Want Him
to Change, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at 13A (“[M]ore [black people] were
for Clarence Thomas than were against him, but it’s close. . . . [A] sizable number of black
people say they simply want an African-American on the U.S. Supreme Court. If it’s got to be
a tarnished Clarence Thomas, so be it. That’s what happens when it takes so long for a group
of people, such as African-Americans, to get recognition.”). The reasons for supporting
Thomas varied. Some Blacks believed that Thomas would prove to be an advocate for civil
rights while on the bench. Others were more skeptical, such as Joseph Lowery of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a supporter who explained that he was willing
to support Thomas during his confirmation hearings “because ‘[he] figured that if a white
man named [Hugo] Black could learn to think colored, then a Negro named Tom might
learn to think black.’” Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6, 1996,
at 68.
203
See Joyce A. Baugh & Christopher E. Smith, Doubting Thomas: Confirmation
Veracity Meets Performance Reality, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 455, 467 (1996) (describing
several feminist organizations that opposed Thomas). Even in everyday public
circumstances, Justice Thomas draws harsh criticisms from his challengers. For instance,
while standing in a public library with childhood friend Lester Johnson, a woman
approached Justice Thomas and his company to say “I just wanted to see what a group of
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especially after allegations of sexual harassment from Anita Hill, a black
female graduate of Yale Law School graduate who had worked with
Thomas at the Department of Education and the EEOC. 204 Hill claimed
that Thomas sexually harassed her during her tenure in those departments.
After Hill’s sexual harassment charge was leaked to the press, Congress
presided over public hearings that questioned both Thomas and Hill about
the charge.205
In response to the challenges to his nomination and
appointment,206 Thomas famously called the Thomas-Hill hearings a
Uncle Toms look like.” Merida & Fletcher, supra note 176, at 8. Additionally, Leonard
Small, a childhood friend of Justice Clarence Thomas, said of him, “People don’t
understand why we call people Uncle Toms. . . . But in the novel [Uncle Tom’s Cabin],
Eliza ran from slavery and Uncle Tom stayed. While we are trying to run for freedom,
Clarence Thomas is not only staying, he’s telling.” Id. at 27.
Thomas was also heavily criticized for how he lambasted his sister in public.
Thomas once said of his sister, “She gets mad when the mailman is late with her welfare
check.” Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75; see also GREENYA,
supra note 5, at 17. At the time, Thomas made these comments about his sister, she was
not on welfare. Thomas’s sister later explained why she had ever been on public
assistance, stating that “[w]hen she was on welfare . . . she was not only taking care of
her kids but had responsibility for her elderly aunt, who raised her, and an uncle.”
Merida & Fletcher, supra note 176, at 28. To her, her choice was simple–“[She] had a
choice of taking care of these old people or keeping a job.” See id.
204
See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas: First Term, First Impressions,
35 HOW. L.J. 115, 116 (1992). According to a Washington Post article in 1992, “the
public believed Anita Hill by a margin of 53 percent to 37 percent.” JOHN C. DANFORTH,
RESURRECTION 200 (1994) (citing Richard Morin, Harassment Consensus Grows; Poll
Finds Greater Awareness of Misconduct, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1992, at A1).
205
See Adrienne D. Davis and Stephanie Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt:
Treatment of Race and Sex in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367, 136972 (1992) (noting that National Public Radio correspondent Nina Totenberg aired the
complaint, which caused Congress to delay Thomas’s confirmation vote to hold hearings
on Hill’s allegations).
206
The Latino/a community is experiencing a similar debate regarding the
nomination of Miguel Estrada to the United States D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Indeed, Estrada has been called “a Justice Clarence Thomas in the making, a young
lawyer thrust toward the Supreme Court as a conservative ideologue no more
representative of Hispanics than Thomas was of blacks.” Frank Davies, Bush Court
Nominee Raises Liberal Hackles – Critics Characterize Honduran-American as FarRight Ideologue Lacking In Experience, STAR LEDGER, Jan. 6, 2002, at 29. Many liberals
hope that “Latino groups will learn from the lessons of the Clarence Thomas nomination,
eschew the misguided racialist solidarity that entrapped many African Americans, and do
the right thing . . . [which is] oppos[e] the nomination of Miguel Estrada.” Calmore,
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“high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think for
themselves.”207 In so doing, he abandoned black conservatives’ rejection
of what they call victimology and has been heavily criticized by many
persons for claiming racism after chastising others for doing the same in
the past.208 Despite Hill’s allegations of harassment and the extreme
opposition to Thomas’s confirmation by prominent organizations on the
left, Thomas was confirmed as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
His confirmation was by the narrowest margin in modern history, 5248.209
The enormous support that Thomas received from the first President
supra note 21, at 211-12.
207
Hearings, supra note 160, at 157 (testimony of Clarence Thomas). Thomas
further claimed that the hearings regarding Hill’s allegations were “a message that you
[meaning Blacks] kow-tow to an old order, this is what will happen to you, you will be
lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a committee of the U.S. Senate, rather than hung from
a tree.” Hearings, supra note 160, at 157 (testimony of Clarence Thomas).
208
See, e.g., Donna Britt, Those Fateful, Hateful Hearings, WASH. Post, Oct. 15,
1991, at E01 (“What else do I hate? The warp speed with which bootstrapper
extraordinaire Clarence Thomas adopts the pose of black victim whenever it suits him.”);
Brent Staples, Lynching, as Surreal Slogan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991 (“Judge Thomas
has consistently played the race card. . . . Clarence Thomas has always benefited from
his race and victimization. It’s just that he has made his case slyly, in subtext, most
recently with his sharecropper grandfather in the starring role. . . . Who lynched whom?
Judge Thomas’s appeal to that brutal imagery was at once his shrewdest and most
deplorable tactic.”). Many individuals have criticized Thomas for “playing the race card”
by claiming to be a victim of a “high-tech lynching” during his confirmation hearings, not
only because Thomas sought to downplay his race in his professional life, but also
because Thomas’s accuser was not a white, but a black, woman. See Merida & Fletcher,
supra note 176, at 11 (quoting five black law professors at University of North Carolina
as stating “in a nation ‘in which African Americans are disproportionately poor,
undereducated, imprisoned and politically compromised . . ., identity–racial identity–very
clearly matters. Were that not the case, Justice Thomas, for all his claims to the contrary,
could not have declared himself the victim of a ‘high-tech lynching’ during the heated
opposition to his appointment to the Supreme Court’”); see also Kendall Ford, Strange
Fruit, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE
THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992), at 364
(noting the irony in Thomas claiming a lynching when the alleged victim was a black
woman); Eleanor Clift, McLaughlin Group (October 12, 1991) (“Using racism when civil
rights organizations oppose him, when his accuser is black, and when he himself has
walked away from the civil rights movement and affirmative action is really intellectual
dishonesty. . . . [Anita Hill] has done nothing to suggest she has a credibility problem,
whereas Clarence Thomas has done a lot to suggest that he can lie pretty easily.”).
209
See FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 47.
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Bush’s administration,210 as well as many prominent white Republican
Congressmen and politicians,211 only worked to heighten suspicions
among the black community.212 One of the most vocal critics of Thomas
both before and after his nomination was the highly regarded Judge Leon
Higginbotham, the late federal judge from the United States Third Circuit
Court of Appeals. In fact, after Thomas was seated on the Court, Judge
Higginbotham published a letter to Justice Thomas in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review that condemned the Justice for his critique of
civil rights organizations and lawyers and urged Justice Thomas to use his
new role to “assure equal justice under laws for all persons.”213
210

George H.W. Bush and his administration had been heavily criticized for having
“racist” politics. For example, Bush was lambasted for utilizing a demonized image of
Willie Horton in television advertisements during his campaign as a means of
engendering fear in middle and upper class white Americans. Willie Horton was a black
criminal who, while on a work release program of the Dukakis governorship, raped and
murdered a white woman. See Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-coding” Racial
Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. R. & L. 626-27
(2000) (describing how former President Bush used Willie Horton to appeal to Whites’
racism and fear of black male criminals).
211
In defense of Justice Thomas, Republican Senator Danforth, a friend and former
supervisor, asserted, “What Clarence is all about . . . is that in this country you should
have the freedom to think what you want to think, whether you’re black, white, or
anything else.” David Gergen, The Brief on Clarence Thomas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, July 15, 1991. Additionally, David Duke, a “former” white supremacist openly
declared support for Thomas’s nomination. Likewise, Strom Thurmond, a once staunch
segregationist, became one of Thomas’s strongest supporters. See Hearings, supra note
160, at 22-25 (testimony of Clarence Thomas).
212
See Smith, supra note 81, at 11 (stating “there is something wrong when white
men rally around a black man. Why would all these white senators rally around this
black man? After all, this is America.”).
213
A. Leon Higginbotham, An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a
Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005, 1028 (1992). But see Wilson,
supra note 199, at 145–47 (defending Justice Thomas’s right to vote conservatively and
“make his contribution in his own way”).
During his confirmation hearings, Clarence Thomas asserted that he recognized the
sacrifices that many civil rights activists had made for him, stating:
So many others gave their lives, their blood, their talents. But for
them I would not be here. Justice Marshall, whose seat I have been
nominated to fill, is one of those who had the courage and the intellect. He
is one of the great architects of the legal battles to open doors that seemed
so hopelessly and permanently sealed and to knock down barriers that
seemed so insurmountable to those of us in the Pin Point, Georgias of the
world.
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In contrast to the white conservative community, which has
consistently praised Justice Thomas as one of the brightest judicial
figures, much of the black community has largely ignored or ridiculed the
Justice.214 Numerous protests and challenges to Justice Thomas’s
appearance at several events indicate that it is unlikely that any wholesale
approval of the Justice from the much of black community will occur in
the near future.215
The civil rights movement, Reverend Martin Luther King and the
SCLC, Roy Wilkins and the NAACP, Whitney Young and the Urban
League, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Dorothy Hite, they changed
society and made it reach out and affirmatively help. I have benefited
greatly from their efforts. But for them there would have been no road to
travel.
Hearings, supra note 160, at 109 (testimony of Clarence Thomas)).
214
Calmore, supra note 21, at 180. For example, for the past seven years, Ebony
Magazine has not listed Justice Thomas as one of the 100 most influential AfricanAmericans. Thomas has been consistently ridiculed within the black and liberal
communities. For example, Emerge Magazine twice parodied the Justice on its cover. In
the first cartoon, Thomas was wearing an Aunt Jemina-style headscarf. In the second
cartoon, Thomas was pictured as a lawn jockey standing in front of the Supreme Court.
Inside the pages of the magazine, there was drawing of Clarence Thomas shining the
shoes of Justice Scalia. See George E. Curry & Trevor W. Coleman, Uncle Thomas:
Lawn Jockey of the Far Right, EMERGE, Nov. 1996, at 38.
215
Most recently, on February 28, 2002, five black law professors at the University
of North Carolina boycotted Justice Thomas’s visit to the law school. These law
professors have been named “The Law School Five.” Along with their boycott, the five
professors issued a statement. It reads in part:
On Wednesday, March 6, 2002, Clarence Thomas, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, will visit the
University of North Carolina School of Law. Plans for his visit include
a breakfast with students, lunch and coffee with the faculty, visits to
selected classes, and an afternoon appearance at the Carolina Club.
And while many law students, faculty, staff, and alumni are expected
to participate in the day's events, we the law school’s five AfricanAmerican faculty members will not join them. Although it has been
reported in the local press that the law school is “delighted” to have
Justice Thomas visit, we emphatically do not share that delight.
For many people who hold legitimate expectations for racial
equality and social justice, Justice Thomas personifies the cruel irony
of the fireboat burning and sinking. For some--certainly, for us--his
visit adds insult to injury. We note, parenthetically, that Justice
Thomas follows the recent visits of Justices Scalia and O’Connor.
Thus, within the last few years the law school will have brought to the
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Thomas’s own reaction to the protests against his appearances
exhibits his hurt at being shunned and rejected by the black community.
In 1998, Justice Thomas spoke at the annual convention of the National
Bar Association, the largest organization of black attorneys and judges,
after much protest and debate.216 In his speech to the members of the
campus three of the five justices who have voted consistently to turn
back the clock on racial progress.
We live, today, in a United States that increasingly calls on
African Americans to disavow the salience of race in American life, to
claim that identity doesn’t matter, and that race consciousness in any
and every form is pernicious, even when it seeks to rectify racial
wrongs. But in a United States in which African Americans are
disproportionately poor, undereducated, imprisoned, and politically
compromised, identity--racial identity--very clearly matters. Were that
not the case, Justice Thomas, for all his claims to the contrary, could
not have declared himself the victim of a “high-tech lynching” during
the heated opposition to his appointment to the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, Justice Thomas is not just another Supreme
Court justice with whom we disagree. Rather, as a justice, he not only
engages in acts that harm other African Americans like himself, but
also gives aid, comfort, and racial legitimacy to acts and doctrines of
others that harm African Americans unlike himself--that is, those who
have not yet reaped the benefits of civil rights laws, including
affirmative action, and who have not yet received the benefits of the
white-conservative sponsorships that now empower him. . . .
Calmore, supra note 21, at 225 (Appendix).
216
See Richard Willing, Black Jurist Conference Begins with Controversy, USA
TODAY, Sept. 25, 1998, at 7A. Numerous members of the National Bar Association
complained and protested after its Chairman publicly announced the invitation for Justice
Thomas to speak at the organization’s annual convention. Id. Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham was among those who tried to have Thomas disinvited to the meeting. In
a letter circulated before the convention, he wrote, “It makes no more sense to invite
Clarence Thomas than it would have for the National Bar Association to invite George
Wallace for dinner the day after he stood in the schoolhouse door and shouted
‘Segregation today and segregation forever.’” Quoted in Mona Charen, Rejection Is Price
Thomas Pays for Keeping Integrity, FT. WORTH TELEGRAM, Aug. 2, 1998, at 4. Despite
this strong protest, several prominent black legal figures, came to Justice Thomas’s aid,
most notably Judge Damon Keith, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit. In
fact, Judge Keith defended the invitation that was extended to the Justice, and the
invitation was not withdrawn. Indeed, Justice Thomas refused to cancel his appearance
at the convention. See Vern Smith & Ellis Cose, The Obligations of Race, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 10, 1998, at 53.
The National Bar Association’s annual conference and the University of North
Carolina have not been the only places where an appearance by Clarence Thomas has
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National Bar Association, Justice Thomas defended his right to “think for
himself.”217 In his highly charged speech, he asserted:
It pains me deeply–more deeply than any of you can
imagine–to be perceived by so many members of my race
as doing them harm, all the sacrifice, all the long hours of
preparation were to help, not hurt. . . . I have come here
today not in anger or to anger, though my mere presence
has been sufficient, obviously to anger some, nor have I
come to defend my views, but rather to assert my right to
think for myself, to refuse to have my ideas assigned to
me, as though I was an intellectual slave.218
Clearly, Justice Thomas identifies strongly as a black man and believes
that his ideologies are best suited to aid Blacks,219 but thus far, he has
failed to meet the challenge convincing others that he is not a puppet of
“forces hostile to his own people.”220

been boycotted by members of the black community. For example, in 1996, school
officials at a predominantly black middle school in Landover, Maryland revoked an
invitation for Justice Thomas to speak at the school’s eighth grade graduation. Parents
and children successfully rallied to get Justice Thomas reinvited as a speaker. See Jackie
Cissell, Justice Clarence Thomas: He’s Not Going Away, No Matter How Hard His
Critics Pray, NEW VISIONS COMMENT., at 1. Likewise, two black board members of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii resigned after the organization invited Justice
Thomas to speak in a debate on affirmative action. See Merida & Fletcher, supra note
176, at 11. One of the black board members, Eric Ferrer, proclaimed that inviting Justice
Thomas would be like “inviting Hitler to come speak on the rights of Jews.” Id. at 11;
Calmore, supra note 21, at 180.
217
Clarence Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, July 29, 1998,
available at http://douglassarchives.org/thom_b30.htm
218
Id.
219
It is clear from his words that Justice Thomas is hurt by his ostracism from the
black community. Essayist Debra Dickerson said the following about the Justice after
she engaged in long conversations with him about the difficulties that black Republicans
face: “I think he would clearly love his relationship with the black community to be
different . . . There is a wistfulness there. You can’t be outside of the fold and not feel it.
. . . He is the lowest of the low in sort of official blackdom. It’s unfair, and it’s got to
hurt.” Quoted in Merida & Fletcher, supra note 176, at 11.
220
Hill, supra note 63, at 28.
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III.

BLACK ROBE, BLACK VOICE

Although many Blacks and Whites refuse to see Justice Thomas as
anything other than an “Uncle Tom,”221 his jurisprudence on certain
issues, regardless of whether one views his ideologies as beneficial to
black people, speaks volumes as to whether he is a “slave” of any white
conservative, including Justice Scalia. In particular, when considered in
light of the philosophies that have developed into black conservative
thought, which focuses on the effects of certain policies and programs on
black people as opposed to mere principles of formal equality, one can
readily see that Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence on issues, such as
education and desegregation, affirmative action, and crime, are rooted in
black conservative ideology. This Part evaluates and analyzes selected
Supreme Court opinions and explicates how Justice Thomas embraces
various strands of black conservative thought (as distinct from white
conservative ideology) in his opinions.
A. Education/Desegregation
I am the only one at this table who attended a segregated school. And
the problem with segregation was not that we didn’t have white people
in our class. The problem was that we didn’t have equal facilities. We
didn’t have heating, we didn’t have books, and we had rickety chairs.
All society owed us was equal resources and an equal opportunity to
make something of ourselves.
–Clarence Thomas, in 1995 at the Justices’
conference in which Missouri v. Jenkins
was discussed222

As noted earlier, a significant component of black conservative
thought on education is its critique of the strategy that was employed by
civil rights activists in their efforts to improve the lot of black children in
public schools.223 For many black conservatives (and even to some black
221

Justice Thomas is not the only person to be labeled a traitor to the race. Many
other black conservatives, including J.C. Watts, Colin Powell, Condoleeza Rice, and
Shelby Steele “have been labeled expedients, Uncle Toms, oreos, [and] sell-outs.” See
WATTS, supra note 67, at 3.
222
Quoted in Rosen, supra note 202, at 66.
223
See supra Part I(B)(2).
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liberals today),224 this strategy focused far too much on an integrative
ideal, and not enough on improving the actual educational opportunities
and resources available to black children.225
More importantly, this idea that the past civil rights strategy
improperly relied on the belief that integration in itself was the solution to
educational inequalities is one that Justice Thomas has expressed
repeatedly, both on and off the bench. For example, even before Thomas
sat on the Court, he articulated these very same criticisms, stating:
There were grand opportunities for them to focus on the
proper education of minority kids, the kids who are getting
the worst education, and instead they’re talking about
integration. God–I went to segregated schools. You can
really learn how to read off those books, even if white
folks aren’t there. I think segregation is bad, I think it’s
wrong, it’s immoral. I’d fight against it with every breath
in my body, but you don’t need to sit next to a white
person to learn how to read and write. The NAACP needs
to say that.226
Additionally, in response to a question by Senator Specter during his
confirmation hearings on September 16, 1991, Thomas asserted:
The concern that a number of us raise with respect to just
as individuals in this society, as individuals who have
watched the changes in our country, was simply that if we
could demonstrate that the educational opportunities were
224

See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr, Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice:
Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1993).
Derrick Bell, professor of law at New York University School of Law, has even asserted
that he would have dissented from Brown, arguing that the Court should have enforced
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which established the concept of separate but
equal.
225
See Hill, supra note 63, at 30.
226
Quoted in Bill Kauffman, Clarence Thomas, available at
http://reason.com/cthomasint.shtml; see also GREENYA, supra note 5, at 33 (noting
that Thomas stated that the nuns in the all-black school he attended gave “the same
tests the white schools took” and that “[t]hey refused to let [Thomas and his
classmates] buy into the notion that [they] could never do well, despite all the
stereotypes of inferiority around [them]”).
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improving for minorities, then whether it is busing or any
other technique, then use it, but make sure that we are
helping these young kids. That was totally out of the legal
context. That just simply would have been a preference
that I expressed as a citizen.227
As a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas received his first opportunity
to insert these principles into his jurisprudence in United States v.
Fordice.228 In Fordice, a lawsuit was filed against the State of
Mississippi, alleging that despite the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board
of Education,229 the state had continued its policy of de jure segregation in
its public university system by maintaining five almost completely white
universities and three almost exclusively black universities. In filing this
lawsuit, the plaintiffs referenced the state’s history of discrimination in its
public university system.230 In particular, the plaintiffs specified that the
University of Mississippi had only admitted its first black student in 1962,
which was eight years after the first decision in Brown, and even then only
under court order.231 Additionally, they explained that, although, in 1973,
the state had devised a plan (one that was rejected by the United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) to disestablish the de jure
segregated university system, the state had refused to fund the plan until
1978, five years later, and even then with only half the amount
requested.232 Finally, they concluded that, by the mid-1980s, more than
ninety-nine percent of Mississippi’s white students were enrolled at the
five almost completely white universities, and seventy-one percent of the
state’s black students were enrolled at the three almost exclusively black
universities.233
In deciding whether the State of Mississippi had met its
227

Hearings, supra note 160, at 489 (testimony of Thomas).
505 U.S. 717 (1992).
229
See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown I, the Supreme Court held that statemandated segregation in public educational institutions was unconstitutional, and in
Brown II, the Supreme Court ordered an end to segregated public education “with all
deliberate speed.”
230
See id. at 723-25.
231
See Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
232
See id. at 722-23.
233
See id. at 724-25.
228
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affirmative duty to dismantle its prior dual university system, the Court
first noted that a state does not satisfy “its constitutional obligations until
it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its prior de jure dual
system that continue to foster segregation.”234 The Court then held that
the fact that college attendance is by choice in the higher education
context is not sufficient in itself to show that a state has abandoned its
dual, race-based system.235 “If policies traceable to the de jure system are
still in force and have discriminatory effects, those policies too must be
reformed to the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational
practices.”236 The Court further held that, had the Fifth Circuit applied
the correct standard to the plaintiffs’ claims, it may have concluded that
Mississippi’s policies regarding admissions standards, program
duplication in the black and white institutions, and mission assignments,
although race neutral, substantially restricted students’ choices of which
institution to enter based on race and remanded the case.237
Justice Thomas authored a concurrence in Fordice, agreeing with
the majority’s ruling that a state does not satisfy its “obligation to
dismantle a dual system of higher education merely by adopting raceneutral policies” and the standard that the majority had established for
evaluating desegregation in the higher education context.238 In so doing,
Justice Thomas began his concurrence with a quote from W.E.B. DuBois,
who had once argued that all-black schools could be more conducive to
advancing the learning of black children than integrated schools.239
234

Id. at 728.
Id. at 729.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 732–43.
238
Id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring).
239
See id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also W.E. Burghardt DuBois, Does
the Negro Need Separate Schools, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328 (1935). Justice Thomas’s
reference to DuBois is ironic, given DuBois’s strong opposition to Washington. It is also
ironic because DuBois’s argument, as clarified later, rested on the idea that Blacks should
rally behind separate schools as a practical matter because of Whites’ hostility to Blacks.
See id. at 330 (arguing that there must be separate schools “because of an attitude on the
part of white people which is not going materially to change in our time”). In this sense,
the segregation was not by choice, but by concession; it is segregation by individual
choice that Justice Thomas does not contest and bases his jurisprudence on
desegregation. See supra Part I; see also Sheryll Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs
and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 729, 730, 733-34 (2001) (maintaining that, for some of the black
235
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Noting DuBois’s statement that “‘[w]e must rally to the defense of our
schools,’”240 Thomas explained that he wrote a separate concurrence to
emphasize that the standard applied in Fordice did not compel the
elimination of racial balance within the system as required in the gradeschool context and thus would not necessitate the “destruction of
historically black colleges nor the severing of those institutions from their
distinctive histories and traditions.”241
Although Justice Thomas agreed that a court could assume
discriminatory intent from policies adopted during the de jure era to
produce segregative effects and that continued to produce such effects, he
stressed the majority’s holding that these policies must be reformed and
analyzed in accordance with sound educational practices.242 In so doing,
Justice Thomas focused on historically black colleges and universities,
noting their value in and of themselves despite the racist reasons behind
the creation and development of many such colleges and universities.243
Furthermore, Justice Thomas expressed concern that, if courts foreclosed
the possibility that there were sound educational justifications for
maintaining historically black colleges and universities, such schools,
which had maintained a significant value as a learning ground for
numerous black leaders and allowed for the upward mobility of many
Blacks, would be destroyed, ultimately depriving young black students of
an opportunity to attend college.244 Again, as his fellow black
conservatives have expressed over time, Justice Thomas expressed worry
that black students would lose out on an important educational benefit
simply for the sake of integration alone.245 As Justice Thomas noted,
middle-class, the decision to live in an all-black neighborhood is an “acceptance of defeat
in trying to fully enter the American mainstream” based on a desire to escape racism by
Whites in their own homes and neighborhoods).
240
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting W.E.B. DuBois,
Schools, 13 THE CRISIS 111, 112 (1917)).
241
Id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring).
242
See id. at 745-48 (Thomas, J., concurring).
243
See id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Mark Tushnet, Clarence
Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW. L.J. 323, 337-38 (2004) (noting that Justice
Thomas “praises predominantly black institutions as valuable in themselves).
244
See id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Scott Gerber, Justice
Clarence Thomas and the Jurisprudence of Race, 25 S.U. L. REV. 43 (1997)
(analyzing Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Fordice).
245
See id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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historically black colleges and universities are “a symbol of the highest
attainments of black culture,” and “it would be ironic, to say the least, if
the institutions that sustained blacks during segregation were themselves
destroyed in an effort to combat its vestiges.” 246
Moreover, Justice Thomas’s focus in his concurrence was highly
different from that of Justice Scalia, who concurred in part and dissented
in part.247 While Justice Scalia agreed that Mississippi was required under
the Constitution to remove discriminatory barriers at its public universities
and colleges, that this requirement did not mandate equal funding between
the historically white and historically black institutions, and that
Mississippi’s admissions requirements needed to be reviewed, he chose to
focus his energies on the ambiguities in the majority’s standard for
evaluating the efficacy of a state’s efforts to diseatablish de jure
segregation.248 Specifically, he criticized and rejected the majority’s test
as ambiguous and unattainable.249 Although Justice Scalia agreed with
Justice Thomas that the standards that applied to evaluating a formerly de
jure system in the grade school context did not apply in the higher
education context, Justice Scalia questioned what the majority meant by
requiring that the state’s prior de jure system must be eliminated to the
extent practicable and consistent with educational practices.250 For Justice
Scalia, the former de jure states had only one duty: “to eliminate
discriminatory obstacles to admission.”251 Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice
Scalia joined in the majority only in so far as it held that Mississippi failed
to meet its burden to show that it had eliminated intentional
246

Id. at 748-49 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION, FROM ISOLATION TO MAINSTREAM: PROBLEMS OF THE COLLEGES
FOUNDED FOR NEGROES 11 (1971)) (“The colleges founded for Negroes are both a source
of pride to blacks who have attended them and a source of hope to black families who
want the benefits of higher learning for their children. They have exercised leadership in
developing educational opportunities for young blacks at all levels of instruction, and,
especially in the South, they are still regarded as key institutions for enhancing the
general quality of the lives of black Americans.”).
247
See id. at 749 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248
Id. at 749–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249
See id. at 750-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250
Id. at 752–53 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 755 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Establishment of neutral admission standards, not the eradication of all ‘policies
traceable to the de jure system . . . having discriminatory effects’ is what Hawkins is
about.”) (citations omitted).
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discriminatory admission standards. To Justice Scalia, it was the
unattainable and vague standards that proved most troublesome,252 and not
necessarily the continued survival of “a symbol of the highest attainments
of black culture.”253
Three years after Fordice, Justice Thomas sat on another case,
Missouri v. Jenkins,254 which addressed another state’s attempts to remedy
previously mandated segregation by law––this time, the State of Missouri.
In that case, the State of Missouri challenged the district court’s orders
requiring the state to fund salary increases for instructional and noninstructional staff within the Kansas City, Missouri, School District and to
continue to fund remedial quality education programs because student
achievement levels were still at or below national norms at all grade
levels.255 The salary increases and the remedial quality education
programs were part of a larger, proposed plan to convert the district’s
public schools into magnet schools that “would draw non-minority
students from private schools who have abandoned or avoided [the school
district], and draw in additional non-minority students from the
suburbs.”256
In ruling on the State of Missouri’s challenge to the district court’s
remedial orders for the school district, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
252

Justice Scalia concluded:
What I do predict is a number of years of litigation-driven
confusion and destabilization in the university systems of all the
formerly de jure States, that will benefit neither blacks nor whites,
neither predominantly black institutions nor predominately white
ones. Nothing good will come of this judicially ordained turmoil,
except the public recognition that any court that would knowingly
impose it must hate segregation. We must find some other way of
making that point.
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 762 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253
Justice Scalia did comment, however, on how the Fordice decision could
negatively impact historically black colleges and universities. For example, Justice
Scalia interpreted the decision as preventing the adoption of any policy to provide equal
funding to both black and white institutions because “equal funding, like program
duplication, facilitates continued segregation–enabling students to attend schools where
their own race predominates without paying a penalty in the quality of their education.”
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 759 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
254
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
255
See id. at 73.
256
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 77.
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authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the challenged orders were
beyond the remedial authority of the district court.257 Specifically, in
reviewing the authority by which the district could approve salary
increases for instructional and non-instructional staff, the Court asserted
that a proper analysis of the case would rest on whether the remedy “[wa]s
necessarily designed . . . to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct.”258 The Court then held that the order approving across-theboard salary increases was beyond the scope of the district court because
it was grounded in an effort to “‘improv[e] the desegregative
attractiveness’” of the school district, rather than to eliminate racially
identifiable schools within the district.259 In addition, the Court
determined that the district court’s order requiring the State to continue to
fund remedial quality education programs was not an appropriate test for
deciding whether the dual school system had achieved partial unitary
status because it was grounded in an effort to improve student
achievement levels to meet national norms, as opposed to focusing on
“whether the reduction in achievement by minority students attributable to
prior de jure segregation ha[d] been remedied to the extent practicable.”260
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the district court to
determine if, consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion, the district
court’s supervision should be withdrawn.261
As in Fordice, Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion to
emphasize “a few thoughts with respect to the overall course of [the]
litigation.”262 Obviously referring to the district plan to create a magnet
school district that would attract white students and suburban students
back to the district, Justice Thomas blasted the district court with the
black conservative concept that a focus on integration unnecessarily
withdraws attention from the quality of education that black children are
receiving in schools in their own neighborhoods. He wrote:
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See id. at 90-93.
Id. at 89.
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Id. at 91–93, 98-100.
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Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing
to assume that anything that is predominately black must
be inferior. Instead of focusing on remedying the harm
done to those black schoolchildren injured by segregation,
the District Court here sought to convert the Kansas City,
Missouri, School District (KCMSD) into a “magnet
district” that would reverse the “white flight” caused by
desegregation.263
For Justice Thomas, he found the very idea of focusing on the creation of
a school district that would attract Whites offensive because he believed
that that idea rested on the notion that the school would automatically
improve or be made better because its white population had returned.264
Like his conservative counterparts, Justice Thomas’s main issue
was black empowerment, not integration for integration’s sake. 265 As
Justice Thomas expressed in his concurrence:
Racial isolation itself is not a harm; only state-enforced
segregation is. After all, if separation is a harm, and if
integration therefore is the only way that blacks can
receive a proper education, then there must be something
263

Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Brown, supra note 124, at 312–13
(“Justice Thomas criticizes the focus on integration as a route to educational equality and
encourages the black community to look within itself: in other words, to exploit
resources innovatively that presently exist in the black community.”).
264
Id. at 114, 119 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that such ideas rest on an
assumption of black inferiority).
265
See id. at 121–22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Given that desegregation has not
produced the predicted leaps forward in black educational achievement, there is no
reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded when
surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an integrated
environment.”). Cf. Michael A. Middleton, Brown v. Board: Revisited, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J.
19, 21 (1995) (commenting that the author was bothered by the idea that the problem of
addressing “damaging effects of segregation . . . can be corrected by the simple expedient
of appropriately mixing Black and White bodies”). But see Jose Felipe Anderson,
Perspectives on Missouri v. Jenkins: Abandoning the Unfinished Business of Public
School Desegregation “With All Deliberate Speed,” 39 HOW. L.J. 693, 695 (1996)
(arguing that we “must pursue integration even while acknowledging recent failures that
have led some to call for the abandonment of techniques designed to integrate public
schools”).
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inferior about blacks. Under this theory, segregation
injures blacks because blacks, when left on their own,
cannot achieve.266
Indeed, Justice Thomas took his argument one step further, again
arguing as he did in Fordice, that predominantly black schools (despite
their origins in state-enforced segregation) are often well-suited to provide
education and direction to young black children for a variety of reasons.267
In particular, Thomas explained that, “[b]ecause of their distinctive
histories and traditions, black schools can function as the center and
symbol of black communities, and provide examples of independent black
leadership, success, and achievement.”268 In sum, much like his fellow
black conservatives, Justice Thomas was pointing to a symbol of AfricanAmerican history to show Blacks had repeatedly overcome segregation
and other similar obstacles to educate themselves. Only this time, as
Thomas was contending, the legal obstacle of Jim Crow had been
removed.
In fact, Thomas’s concurrence in Jenkins has even been used by
one author to support an Afrocentric curriculum that “articulates a vision
of black culture which meets the intersubjective needs of black youth.”269
Much like Thomas and his black conservative cohorts, this author
maintained that blacks should turn inward and construct creative remedies
to utilize the resources within the community to advance academic
achievement among black children.270
266

Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 48 (“Thomas wants to know in every instance what
integration means for blacks. If it means losing the alternative of going to their own
schools, running their own businesses, then he doesn’t like it. He has too many scars
from episodes in which, in the name of integration, he was the only black.”).
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Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121-22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[Historically black
schools] can be both a source of pride to blacks who have attended them and a source of
hope to black families who want the benefits of . . . learning for their children.”).
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Id. at 122 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Brown, supra note 124, at 319
(“Essentially, black educators took institutions that were scorned and resource-deprived,
and turned them into thriving centers of academic excellence. Moreover, these schools
provide benefits that go far beyond the academic enrichment of individual students; often
they accrue to the larger black community.”).
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Brown, supra note 124, at 314.
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See id.
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Indeed, in Zellman v. Simmons-Harris,271 the case in which the
Supreme Court held that a voucher program in Ohio did not violate the
Establishment Clause,272 Justice Thomas himself expressed this concept
of “turning inward,” starting with a quote by Frederick Douglass:
“Education . . . means emancipation. It means light and liberty. It means
the uplifting of the soul of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by
which men can only be made free.”273 In so doing, Thomas highlighted
that “failing urban public schools disproportionately affect minority
children most in need of educational opportunity.”274 He also contended
that just as Blacks had supported and fought for public education during
Reconstruction, they now advocated school choice and voucher programs
because it offered them a hope and means to educate properly their
children despite struggling and failing communities.275 In essence, like
his black fellow conservatives, he viewed these programs as vital because
they gave minority parents a means of placing the reins back in their own
hands––to rely on themselves and their choices for their children’s
education.
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Zellman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
For a discussion of constitutional questions raised under the religion clauses, see
Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 119 (2000) (discussing the need for careful constitutional limits on public funding
of religious institutions).
273
Id. at 2480 (Thomas, J., concurring). (quoting The Blessings of Liberty and
Education: An Address Delivered in Manassas, Virginia, on 3 September 1894, in 5 THE
FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 623 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds. 1992)).
274
Id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., concurring).
275
Zellman, 122 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the time of
Reconstruction, blacks considered public education ‘a matter of personal liberation and a
necessary function of a free society.’ Today, however, the promise of public school
education has failed poor inner-city blacks. While in theory providing education to
everyone, the quality of public schools varies significantly across districts. Just as blacks
supported public education during Reconstruction, many blacks and other minorities now
support school choice programs because they provide the greatest educational
opportunities for their children in struggling communities.”); see also id. n.7 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“Minority and low-income parents express the greatest support for parental
choice and are most interested in placing their children in private schools. ‘[T]he appeal
of private schools is especially strong among parents who are low in income, minority,
and live in low-performing districts: precisely the parents who are the most
disadvantaged under the current system.’) (citing T. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC 164 (2001)).
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B. Affirmative Action
[Clarence] Thomas’s critics may snigger that he is sitting comfortably
in one of the most powerful seats in government, trying to tell
everyone else to make it on merit. But this attitude only proves
Thomas right.
–Robyn Blumer276

Justice Thomas’s stance on opposing affirmative action has
received enormous press not only because it seems, to many, to be hostile
to black interests but also because it looks as if Justice Thomas is rejecting
his personal history.277 A number of Thomas’s critics condemn him for
drawing up the ladder of affirmative action after he has climbed it.278 In
response, Justice Thomas has asserted that his critics’ words only support
his views on affirmative action, demonstrating how affirmative action
negatively impacts those who have worked hard to achieve on their own
by tagging them as beneficiaries of race-based preferences.279
276

Robyn Blumer, Thomas Opposes Affirmative Action Because of Experience,
THE SALT LAKE TRIB., July 4, 2003, at A13.
277
See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s Tool to Dismantle His House:
Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 1-5, on file with author) (describing how many
commentators feel that Justice Thomas has pulled up the ladder of affirmative action after
climbing it). Justice Thomas denies ever being a beneficiary of affirmative action. In an
interview in the late 1980’s, Thomas once asserted, “This thing about how they let me
into Yale – that kind of stuff offends me. All they did was stop stopping us.” Williams,
A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75. Abraham Goldstein, Dean of Yale Law
School from 1970 to 1975, and James Thomas, who was an admissions officer for Yale
Law School when Clarence Thomas applied in 1971, assert otherwise. For example,
Dean Goldstein stated, He had “no doubt . . . that in some measure Clarence was
preferred because of his background.” See Justice Clarence Thomas; A Classic Example
of an Affirmative Action Baby, J. BLACKS HIGHER. EDUC., Jan., 31, 1998, at 35.
278
See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Where Would Thomas Be Without Affirmative
Action, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 26, 2003, at B7 (asserting that Thomas
“could not make a powerful legal argument against racial preferences, given the fact
that he got into Yale Law School and got picked for the Supreme Court thanks to his
race”).
279
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2362 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (affirmative action unfairly stigmatizes
Blacks who would have been admitted based on “merit” alone and tars them as
“undeserving”).
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This alleged negative impact of affirmative action, however, is not
the only element of Justice Thomas’s philosophy on that subject.
Imbedded in Justice Thomas’s opposition to affirmative action are four
other central ideas: (1) that the approval and support of affirmative action
by Whites is not void of self-interest, but is merely “window dressing”
that is not designed to address true inequalities; (2) that affirmative action
is actually harmful to Blacks because it causes low self-esteem among
Blacks; (3) that affirmative action is harmful because it does not actually
foster equality for Blacks, but instead reinforces a self-defeating sense of
victimization; and (4) that affirmative action fails to assist the vast
majority of poor black people, instead mostly assisting the black middle
class and upper middle class. 280
Thus, unlike white conservative ideology, which posits that
affirmative action is unfair because it results in “reverse” discrimination
against Whites, Justice Thomas’s philosophy and jurisprudence on
affirmative action concentrates on what he views as its poisonous impact
on the lives and psyche of Black people.
The first affirmative action case from Justice Thomas’s tenure on
the Supreme Court was Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.281 In that
case, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the government’s practice of
giving general contractors on government projects the financial incentive
of additional compensation to hire subcontractors certified as small
businesses controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged
280

See generally Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350-62; see also Williams, Fairness, supra
note 56, at 74; cf. Seth N. Asumah & Valencia Perkins, Black Conservatism and the
Social Problems in Black America, J. BLACK STUDIES, at 64 (2000) (noting that “Black
conservatives add a self-esteem portion to their position [on affirmative action], claiming
that affirmative action destroys the self-image of Black people” and that Black
conservatives “believe the pride of achievement is diluted because many Whites maintain
that beneficiaries of affirmative action receive jobs, promotions, and school admissions
without being qualified”); ”); STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION BABY (1992) (“The best black syndrome creates in those of us who have
benefited from racial preferences a peculiar contradiction. We are told over and over
that we were the best black people in our profession. And we are flattered. . . . But to
professionals who have worked hard to succeed, flattery of this kind carries an unstable
insult, for we yearn to be called what our achievements often deserve: simply the best-no
qualifiers needed.”). Stephen Carter does not identify as a black conservative. See id. at
7 (“[M]y views on many matters are sufficiently to the left that I do not imagine the
conservative movement would want me.”).
281
515 U.S. 204 (1995).
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individuals” violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.282 The majority, with whom Thomas
concurred, held that all racial classifications imposed by a federal, state,
or local governmental actor, whether benign or not, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny, meaning that all racial
classifications imposed by a governmental actor have to serve a
compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to further
that interest.283
Justice Scalia filed an opinion that concurred in part and concurred
in the judgment of the majority’s opinion.284 He wrote that the
“government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on
the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the
opposite direction.”285 Justice Scalia stressed that such a concept was
foreign to the Constitution, which focuses on the individual.286
In writing his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas gave just a
small taste of how his jurisprudence on affirmative action aligns with
black conservative thought and differs from Justice Scalia’s.287 Like
many of his fellow black conservatives, Justice Thomas did not focus on
the harm that affirmative action causes to “innocent” white individuals,
but instead expressed his views regarding what he deemed to be
affirmative action’s harmful impact on minorities. First, he noted his
belief that there was a racial paternalism underlying the dissent’s view
that distinctions could be made under the constitution “between laws
designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis
of race.”288 Then, he iterated his belief that affirmative action could be
nothing other than harmful to Blacks and other minorities, stating that
“there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended
282

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205. “Socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals” included “Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian
Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be
disadvantaged by the [Small Business] Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the
Small Business Act.” Id. at 205 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§637(d)(2), (3)).
283
Id. at 227-30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
284
See id. at 227 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
285
Id. at 227-30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989)).
286
See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
287
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of
discrimination.”289 Finally, Justice Thomas moved on to identify what he
believes to be the stigmatizing effects of the program on minorities,
stating:
So-called “benign” discrimination teaches many [Whites]
that because of chronic and apparently immutable
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without
their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably such programs
engender attitudes of superiority, or alternatively, provoke
resentment among those who believe that they have been
wronged by the government’s use of race. [T]he programs
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause
them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that
they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”290
It would be nearly ten years before Justice Thomas would receive
another occasion to incorporate core principles of black conservative
thought into his jurisprudence on affirmative action. That time would
come with the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari on two cases from the
Sixth Circuit concerning affirmative action at the University of Michigan,
one in the undergraduate program for Literature, Science, and Arts
program and the other in the law school.
The cases, Gratz v. Bollinger291 and Grutter v. Bollinger,292 ended
a debate over the legality of affirmative action that had transpired since
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,293 the Supreme Court’s
289

Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (stating that “there is a moral and constitutional
equivalence between laws designed to subjugate race and those that distribute benefits on
the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality” and that [g]overnment
cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the
law”).
290
Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Cf. WATTS, supra note
67, at 206 (asserting that race-based solutions “feed on the notion that membership in a
certain race is a handicap, a sure cause of underperformance”).
291
123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
292
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
293
438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the Supreme Court reviewed a racial set-aside
program that reserved 16 out of 100 seats in a medical school class for members of
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decision on the affirmative action program at the University of CaliforniaDavis Medical School in 1977.294 In Gratz, two white students who
applied for and were denied admission to the University of Michigan’s
College of Literature, Science, and Arts as residents of Michigan filed a
lawsuit, claiming that the university’s use of racial preferences in
undergraduate admissions violated their rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.295 In reviewing the case, the
Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, concluded that the college’s admissions
policy, which automatically distributed twenty points to every single
underrepresented minority applicant solely because of race, was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in racial diversity that was
claimed to justify its program and therefore was unconstitutional.296
Justice Thomas joined the majority and wrote a concurrence that was void
of any explicitly “raced” thought.297
His dissent in the second opinion Grutter, however, was different.
It was bursting with many core ideas of black conservative ideology. In
Grutter, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of the State of Michigan who
had applied for and was denied admission to the University of Michigan
Law School, filed a lawsuit, alleging like the plaintiffs in Gratz, that the
law school had violated her constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.298 Specifically, she alleged that “her application was
rejected because the Law School uses race as a ‘predominant’ factor,
giving applicants who belong to certain minority groups ‘a significantly
greater chance of admission than students with similar credentials from
disfavored racial groups.’”299 She further argued that the law school had
certain minority groups. As the Supreme Court noted in Grutter, “The only holding for
the Court in Bakke was that ‘a State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be
served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration
of race and ethnic origin.” Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2236 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320).
294
Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, CONST.
COMM. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 1-2, on file with author) (“The latest pair of
cases announced a truce of sorts in affirmative action hostilities.”).
295
Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2417.
296
Id. at 2427–28.
297
Id. at 2433 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting only one further observation, which
was that the college’s policy did not suffer from the constitutional defect of distinctions
among underrepresented minority applicants because it did not a racial preference to
members of some underrepresented minority groups).
298
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332–33.
299
Id. at 2333 (quoting Appendix 33–34).
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no compelling interest for such use of race.300
In describing its admissions process, the law school provided
evidence to show that, while it maintained records on the racial and ethnic
composition of the class, it never required the admission of a certain
percentage of minority law students.301 Instead, it individually reviewed
each application with race as a plus factor.302 Furthermore, the law school
showed that it worked only to ensure a “critical mass” of underrepresented
minority students at the school “such that underrepresented minority
students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race” and such
that classroom discussion and the educational experience outside of the
classroom could be enhanced by diverse backgrounds and perspectives.303
The law school also presented evidence that demonstrated that the
elimination of its current admissions policies would have an extremely
negative impact on the number of minorities admitted to the law school.304
In Grutter, in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice O’Connor, the
Court held that the law school has a compelling state interest in attaining a
diverse student body305 and that the law school’s use of race in its
admissions process was narrowly tailored to further that compelling
interest of diversity and the educational benefits that flow from having a
diverse student body, such as cross-racial understanding, the tearing down
of stereotypes, and the preparation of students for working in an
increasingly diverse workforce.306 In holding that the law school had a
compelling state interest in diversity, the Supreme Court asserted that it
deferred to the law school’s judgment that diversity was essential to its
educational mission and concluded that “‘good faith’ on the part of a
university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”307 In
determining that the law school’s admissions policies were narrowly
tailored to that interest, the Court declared that the law school’s policies
ensured a highly individualized review of each applicant and gave serious
consideration to the myriad of ways that an applicant could contribute to
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
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See id.
See id. at 2333.
See id. at 2333-34.
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Id. at 2334.
Id. at 2339.
Id. at 2338–42
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
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the diversity of the school in that review.308 Finally, the Court rejected the
suggestion that the law school simply lower its admissions standards,
stating that such remedy would make the law school a very different
institution and would force the law school to sacrifice an essential
component of its educational mission.309
In response to the majority opinion, Justice Thomas wrote an
equally long dissent that was rooted in black conservative ideology on
affirmative action.310 Indeed, Justice Thomas began his dissent with a
quote from Frederick Douglass, a former slave and an abolitionist, in a
speech in 1865.311 Emphasizing the black conservative principle of selfreliance and black empowerment, Thomas began his dissent as follows:
“Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American
308

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Court also set a “time limit” on the use of race-conscious policies, noting that
it expects “that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.” Id. at 2347. See generally Kevin R.
Johnson, supra note 294 (exploring the meaning of the 25-year time limit, the Court’s
authority to set such a time limit, and the practicality of such a time limit).
310
See Cass Sunstein, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Why Grutter Was
Correctly Decided, J. BLACK HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 31, 2003 (asserting that Justice Thomas
abandoned his commitment to originalism and called “for an extraordinary exercise in
judicial activism” in Grutter in light of the fact that “[a] great deal of historical work
suggest that affirmative action was accepted by those who ratified the equal protection
clause”).
311
Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The quote was as follows:
[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is
benevolent, I perceive, than just, manifested towards us. What I ask for
the negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply
justice. The American people have always been anxious to know what
they shall do with us .... I have had but one answer from the beginning.
Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already played the
mischief with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples will not remain on
the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, if
they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! ... And if the
negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give
him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! ... [Y]our
interference is doing him positive injury.
Id. (quoting What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston,
Massachusetts, on 26 January 1865, reprinted in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS
59, 68 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds.1991)).
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life without the meddling of university administrators.”312 Then, as many
other black conservatives have argued, Justice Thomas maintained that the
use of the affirmative action only impairs minority students and that only
self-sufficiency can remedy the disparities that encourage the use of raceconscious admissions. To Justice Thomas, the law school had taken the
easy way out of resolving the educational inequalities between Whites and
the underrepresented minorities that were the targets of its program.313
Then, much like he did in Fordice and Jenkins, Justice Thomas inquired
whether the educational advancement of black students was superior in
more homogenous schools, noting that there is “growing evidence that
racial . . . heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black students”
and citing studies that found that black students who attended historically
black colleges reported higher academic achievement than those who
attended predominantly white colleges.314 In fact, citing Thomas Sowell,
a well-known black conservative and a mentor of his, Justice Thomas
maintained in his dissent that race-conscious admissions policies like that
used by the law school harm, rather than help, minority students because
they allow insufficiently prepared students to study in elite institutions
where they will fail.315 Moreover, like black conservatives such as Shelby
Steele and John McWhorter advise, Justice Thomas argued that current
race-conscious admissions policies only “help to fulfill the bigot’s
prophecy about black underperformance” by creating an incentive for
Blacks to embrace black victimology.316 Specifically, he maintained that
“there is no incentive for the black applicant to continue to prepare for the
LSAT once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score,”317
312

Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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See id. at 2362-63 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Flowers & Pascarella, Cognitive Effects of College Racial Composition on African
American Students After 3 Years of College, 40 J. OF C. STUDENT DEV. 669, 674 (1999)
and Allen, The Color of Success: African-American College Student Outcomes at
Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 26, 35 (1992)).
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Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 176–77 (1994)).
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Id. at 2365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
317
Id. at 2365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id.
n.16 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I use the LSAT as an
example, but the same incentive structure is in place for any admissions criteria,
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meaning the score above which nearly all Blacks were guaranteed
admission. On the other hand, for Whites, those who “aspir[e] to
admission at the Law School have every incentive to improve their score
to levels above that range.”318 In sum, Justice Thomas asked, as do other
black conservatives, what is the benefit of diversity to Blacks, thereby
suggesting that the “real” benefit of diversity as constructed in current
affirmative action programs was for Whites only.319
Additionally, throughout his dissent, Thomas, like other black
conservatives, repeatedly questioned the true interests and motives of the
law school (the Whites who control the university), arguing that the law
school’s interest was purely “aesthetic”––with the law school solely
desiring a “certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in
its classrooms to the color of the students sitting in them.”320 Consistent
with this distrust of white interests in black conservative ideology, Justice
Thomas then openly wondered why, if the law school so valued diversity,
it refused to lower its admissions standards, despite the fact that it would
change the nature and status of the law school.321 Justice Thomas wrote
that the law school’s “reluctance to do [so] suggests that the educational
benefits [from diversity] it alleges are not so significant.”322 Continuing
with his suspicion of the law school’s real interest, Justice Thomas turned
to the law school use of the Law School Admissions Test (“LSAT”) in its
admissions procedures. He wrote that:
including undergraduate grades, on which minorities are consistently admitted at
thresholds significantly lower than whites.”).
318
Id. at 2364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
319
See, e.g., STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, note 24, at 136 (“A law professor says,
‘I want blacks in my classroom when I teach constitutional law. The diversity of opinion
helps us better understand the Constitution.’ But are blacks human beings or teaching
tools? Is it good for human beings to be made to play this role, to be brought in, often in
defiance of standards, because their color is presumed to carry a point of view that
diversifies classroom content?”).
320
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2352 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
321
See id. at 2353 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
322
Id. at 2353 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In other
words, the Law School seeks to improve marginally the education it offers without
sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status.”); see also id. at 2356 (“With the
adoption of different admissions methods, such as accepting all students who meet
minimum qualifications, the Law School could achieve its vision of the racially aesthetic
student body without the use of racial discrimination.”) (citation omitted).
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no modern law school can claim ignorance of the poor
performance of blacks, relatively speaking, on the . . .
LSAT. . . . Nevertheless, law schools continue to use the
test and then attempt to ‘correct’ for black
underperformance by using racial discrimination in
admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic student body.323
This, Justice Thomas suggested, simply showed that the law school was
merely interested in window dressing, and not the actual advancement of
black students.324 In his eyes, the law school only cares if its “class looks
right, even if it does not perform right.”325 As his fellow black
conservatives have often expressed, Justice Thomas finally implied that
persons who govern schools such as the University of Michigan Law
School were only advocating for minorities what they would not advocate
for their own children. He asserted that “aestheticists will never address
the real problems facing ‘underrepresented minorities,’ instead continuing
their social experiments on other people’s children.”326
Lastly, Justice Thomas incessantly referred to what he and other
323

Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2362-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Id. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Id. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To support
this argument, Justice Thomas proposes the following:
For example, there is no recognition by the Law School in this case
that even with their racial discrimination in place, black men are
“underrepresented” at the Law School. Why does the Law School not
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underrepresentation? The answer is, again, that all the Law School
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problems like the crisis of black male underperformance.
Id. n.11(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Tobias Barrington
Wolff & Robert Paul Wolff, The Pimple on Adonis’s Nose: A Dialogue on the Concept of
Merit in the Affirmative Action Debate, 56 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2005)
(highlighting how current admissions plans help those who need the assistance least); cf.
Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Costs of Lawyer Mobility: Of Law Firms, Law Schools,
and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299, 310 (2002-2003) (highlighting how the
rising costs of law school education affect low-income students). But see Cheryl Harris,
Book Review, Mining in Hard Ground, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2487, 2537-38 (2003)
(discussing how middle class Blacks experience disadvantages based on wealth
inequality relative to Whites).
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black conservatives regard as the demoralizing effect of affirmative action
on minorities. Again, as in Adarand, Justice Thomas contended that
affirmative action unfairly stigmatizes Blacks who would have been
admitted based on “merit” alone and tars them as “undeserving.”327 In the
end, he asked, “Who can differentiate between those who belong and
those who do not”––a question that has repeatedly been asked about
Thomas throughout his career and, which given his life experiences at
Yale Law School and in his career, obviously drives in part his views on
affirmative action.328
C. Crime
Look at these young brothers dying in the street—the drive-by
shootings, the violence. If dogs were being struck down at the same
rate and in the same way, and left bleeding in the gutter, there would
be a society of blue-haired women to save our canine friends. But
these are young black men bleeding in the gutter, and no one seems to
give a damn.
–Clarence Thomas329
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Id. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Beyond the
harm the Law School’s racial discrimination visits upon its test subjects, no social science
has disproved the notion that this discrimination ‘engender[s] attitudes of superiority or,
alternatively, provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that they have been
wronged by the government’s use of race.’”); id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. 204, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment)); id. (“Who can differentiate between those who
belong and those who do not? The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School
because of discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving. This
problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are
actually the ‘beneficiaries’ of racial discrimination. When blacks take positions in the
highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether
their skin color played a part in their advancement. The question itself is the stigma—
because either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be
deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did not, in which case asking the question itself
unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without discrimination.”).
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See Williams, supra note 56, at 74.
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Quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, supra note 202, at 67; see also Thomas, supra note 30,
at 13 (“We should be at least as incensed about the totalitarianism of drug traffickers and
criminals in poor neighborhoods as we were about totalitarianism in Eastern bloc
countries”).
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In the area of criminal law, Justice Thomas has earned a reputation
as a hard and unforgiving Justice, with many wondering what he meant
when testified before the Senate that he would often watch busloads of
prisoners from his window and say to himself, “[T]here but by the Grace
of God, go I.”330 To many, nothing about his criminal jurisprudence
reflects any empathy for criminals. As noted above, however, a core
principle of black conservative thought on crime is its advocacy for the
severe punishment of criminals and the protection of victims, especially
poor black victims whom black conservatives view as being prisoners in
their own homes due to the rapidly deteriorating conditions of their streets
and neighborhoods.331
Although Justice Thomas has been provided with little opportunity
330

See, e.g., Calmore, supra note 21, at 208; Note, Lasting Stigma, supra note 21,
at 1331 (“Thomas concluded that his story of professional success in the face of
significant obstacles would enable him ‘to stand in the shoes of . . . people across a broad
spectrum’ of American society. He spoke of the view from his office, which allowed
him to see the busloads of criminal defendants being brought to the courthouse: ‘And
you look out, and you say to yourself, and I say to myself almost every day, But for the
grace of God there go I.’ Yet in his first Term on the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas
issued a dissent in Hudson v. McMillian in which he argued that an inmate’s beating by
two prison guards, a beating that bruised the inmate’s face, loosened his teeth, and
cracked his dental plate, did not fall within the Eighth Amendment’s stricture against
cruel and unusual punishments. The dissent sparked scathing criticism and prompted one
editorial to label Justice Thomas the ‘[y]oungest, [c]ruelest Justice.’”); Eric. L. Muller,
Where, But For The Grace of God, Goes He? The Search For Empathy in the Criminal
Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 15 CONST. COMM. 225, 225–26 (1998) (“Once Judge
Thomas became Justice Thomas, this compassionate image tarnished quickly. Empathy
was difficult to discern in his dissent in Hudson v. McMillan, one of his very early
opinions.”); Smith, supra note 95, at 26 (noting that “[o]ne searches in vain, however, for
clear evidence in Thomas’s opinions that he has brought his empathic understanding of
social reality to the Supreme Court”).
When asked at his Senate Confirmation Hearings whether victims should play a
greater role in the criminal justice system, Justice Thomas responded:
My concern would be . . . that we don’t jeopardize the rights of the
victim. Of course, we would like to make sure that the victims are
involved in the process, but we should be very careful, in my view,
that we don’t somehow undermine the validity of the process; that an
individual who is a criminal defendant is in some way harmed by
that.”
Hearings, supra note 160, at 133 (testimony of Clarence Thomas) (emphasis
added).
331
See supra Part I(B)(4).
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to present these exact principles in his jurisprudence, he did express these
very concepts in Chicago v. Morales.332 In Morales, at issue was a
Chicago ordinance that required any police officer to issue an order to
disperse to any person whom he or she reasonably believed to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or
more persons.333 The ordinance had been criticized by many as giving the
police a free license to target and harass young men of color for simply
standing on the corner.334 In reviewing the claim that this ordinance
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance on the ground that it was
unconstitutionally vague in failing to establish minimal guidelines for
enforcement.335
Not surprisingly, Justice Thomas dissented from the majority, in a
writing that was replete with black conservatism. Indeed, as in many of
his other opinions, he echoed many of the principles that have been
expressed by black conservatives, such as Thomas Sowell, asserting that
“gangs fill the daily lives of many of our poorest and most vulnerable
citizens with a terror that the Court does not give sufficient consideration,
often relegating them to the status of prisoners in their own homes.”336
Throughout his dissent, Justice Thomas articulated the black conservative
principle on criminal law that promotes a focus on the victim as opposed
to the criminal perpetrator.337 He also emphasized the “politics of
distinction,” noting how the majority sacrificed good, law-abiding citizens
who made up the vast majority of the community, for the sake of
protecting the “imagined rights” of a few lawbreakers.338 He argued:
332

527 U.S. 41 (1999).
See id. at 45-46.
334
Tony Mauro, Decade After Confirmation, Thomas Becoming a Force on High
Court, FULTON CTY. DAILY REPORT, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1 (stating that ordinance was
viewed as a tool for police to target Blacks).
335
Morales, 527 U.S. at 60-64 (“It applies to everyone in the city who may remain
in one place with one suspected gang member as long as their purpose is not apparent to
an officer observing them. Friends, relatives, teachers, counselors, or even total strangers
might unwittingly engage in forbidden loitering if they happen to engage in idle
conversation with a gang member.”)
336
Id. at 99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
337
See Mauro, supra 334, at 1 (referring to a comment that Thomas “is eloquently
on the side of low-income, law-abiding citizens, not on the side of the criminals”).
338
Morales, 527 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
333
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As one resident described: “There is only about one or two
percent of the people in the city causing the problems
maybe, but it’s keeping ninety eight percent of us in our
houses and off the streets and afraid to shop.” By focusing
exclusively on the imagined rights of two percent, the
Court has denied our most vulnerable citizens the very
thing that Justice Stevens elevates above all else––freedom
of movement.” 339
Additionally, Justice Thomas expressed black conservatives’
distrust of Whites, specifically hinting that the majority had only furthered
the victimization of this society’s most vulnerable citizens (whom black
conservatives consistently argue are poor Blacks) and that those in the
majority made a decision for these citizens that it would not make for their
own communities.340 He wrote:
Today the Court focuses extensively on the “rights” of
gang members and their companions. It can safely do so-- people who will have to live with the consequences do
not live in our neighborhoods. Rather, people who will
suffer from our lofty pronouncements are people like Ms.
Susan Mary Jackson; people who have seen their
neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and violence
and drugs. They are good, decent people who must
struggle to overcome their desperate situation, against all
odds, in order to raise their families, earn a living and
remain good citizens.341
339

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Sowell, supra note 136 (arguing that
“Justice Kennedy [who criticized merciless prison sentences] may feel ‘secure’ where he
lives and works . . . [b]ut the ‘equal protection of the laws’ under the 14th Amendment
applies also to those who live in less elite circumstances”) (emphasis added); cf.
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting Thomas as saying “I don’t understand why those
of us who say we are so passionate about little kids can’t see that they can’t grow up in
these environments” – environments where they are assaulted when they go to school or
are in fear for their lives).
340
Morales, 527 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
341
Morales, 527 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In fact, in his dissent, Thomas gave voice to the many concerned,
law-abiding citizens for whom he argued the ordinance protected. He
quoted several of the citizens who supported the ordinance, such as
eighty-eight year old Susan Mary Jackson, who testified to the following
before the Chicago City Council on the problems of gang loitering:
We used to have a nice neighborhood. We don’t have it
anymore . . . . I am scared to go out in the daytime. . . .
[Y]ou can’t pass because they are standing. I am afraid to
go to the store. I don’t go to the store because I am afraid.
At my age if they look at me real hard, I be ready to
holler.342
For Justice Thomas, the victims’ right to demand a safe neighborhood
deserved equal, if not more, weight than the “imagined” rights of persons
who break the law by refusing a policeman’s orders to disperse.343
Additionally, Justice Thomas has incorporated black conservative
principles regarding the need to eliminate discretion among jurors in his
jurisprudence on capital cases. For example, in Graham v. Collins,344 the
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the three special issues
the sentencing jury was required to answer prevented the jury from
considering mitigating evidence of his youth, unstable family background,
and positive character traits on the ground that such a holding would
require the announcement of a new rule in violation of the principles of
another case.345 There, Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in
which he took advantage of the opportunity to address concerns left by
Furman v. Georgia.346 Noting that “[t]he unquestionable importance of
race in Furman is reflected in the fact that three of the original four
petitioners in the Furman cases were represented by the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,”347 Justice Thomas highlighted the
dangers of leaving sentencing up to irrational juror considerations, such as

342

Id. at 101(Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
344
506 U.S. 461 (1993).
345
See id. at 467-68.
346
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
347
Id. at 481 (Thomas, J., concurring).
343
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class or race animus.348 He then proclaimed, “One would think . . . that by
eliminating explicit jury discretion and treating all defendants equally, a
mandatory death penalty scheme was a perfectly reasonable legislative
response to the concerns expressed in Furman [v. Georgia].”349 In so
doing, he brought to light the black conservative principle that defendants
are only protected against discriminatory sentencing in capital cases if no
discretion is left with the jury.350 In sum, as Justice Thomas had done in
cases concerning education and desegregation and affirmative action,
Justice Thomas has expressed core principles of black conservative
thought in his opinions. Based on what he has written over the last
thirteen years as a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas is likely to continue to
write and develop a “raced” jurisprudence on certain issues.
IV.

CONCLUSION

348

See id. at 481-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas supports mandatory death
sentences because he believes they will help to eliminate racial prejudices and
capriciousness in capital sentencing. See Smith, supra note 95, at 19 (citing Paul M.
Barrett, On The Right: Thomas Is Emerging as Strong Conservative Out to Prove
Himself, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1993, at A1).
350
Somewhat consistent with these views is Justice Thomas’s positions in cases
involving egregious prosecutorial misconduct. For example, in United States v. Williams,
504 U.S. 36 (1992), Justice Thomas split with Justice Scalia, who wrote a majority
opinion holding that a district court may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment on the
ground that the government failed to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury. Instead, Justice Thomas joined with Justice Stevens in his dissent, who
argued that if a prosecutor withheld evidence that would plainly preclude a finding of
probable cause, a district court should be able to dismiss the indictment. Id. at 68-70
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Likewise, in Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118, 121 S. Ct.
873 (2001), the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari, from a case in
which the Third Circuit had held that recovery of damages was barred for a wrongfully
convicted defendant where child witnesses had been improperly coerced by the
prosecution and the defendant’s due process rights were violated by the use of such
testimony at trial. See id. at 873. In that case, Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in a denial
of a petition for writ of certiorari, explaining his opinion that the Third Circuit’s view and
Court’s failure to hear the case left “left victims of egregious prosecutorial misconduct
without a remedy.” Id. at 874; see also Margaret Johns, Reconsidering Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity (manuscript on file with author) (arguing that absolute
prosecutorial immunity denies civil remedies to innocent people who have been
wrongfully convicted of crimes as a result of prosecutorial misconduct).
349
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What does Justice Clarence Thomas’s life and jurisprudence teach
us about race and the impact of racial identity? The lessons are many.
First, Justice Thomas’s story tells us that race is an inescapable
part of a person’s identity, whether one is conservative or liberal or a
racial minority or non-minority.351 Moreover, it demonstrates to us that
race impacts and manifests itself in one’s identity in different ways,
depending on that individual’s personal biography and perceptions of
reality.352 For example, what is evident in Justice Thomas’s life and work
is that he, like many of his black counterparts, is conservative precisely
because he is black. Much like black liberals whose life experiences have
shaped their reactions to issues such as affirmative action in a way that
makes them liberal,353 Justice Thomas’s experiences with race have led
him to adopt ideologies that are strictly based on self-reliance without
government interference in a way that makes him conservative. In fact,
much of Justice Thomas’s beliefs and ideologies are rooted in the
philosophies of his grandfather Myers Anderson, who raised him.354 It
was Anderson, who, although polite, “never, ever trusted” Whites or
buckra;355 taught Thomas “that government, like many other things in the
segregated South, was for whites only;”356 and instilled in Thomas that he
351

See Haney Lopez, supra note 145, at 29 (arguing that race is a powerful social
phenomena); cf. Chris F. Denove & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Jury Selection: An
Empirical Investigation of Demographic Bias, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 285, 293-94, 298
(1995) (noting, based on their demographic study of tort cases, that “[r]ace emerges from
the data as the single most important factor in predicting juror orientation”).
352
See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 210 (1996) (asserting that “identity is a complex interplay
between what [one] chooses[s] and what is forced upon” him or her); Angela P. Harris,
Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 774 (1994)
(“‘Race’ is real, and pervasive: our very perceptions of the world, some theorists argue,
are filtered through a screen of ‘race.’”); see also Smith, supra note 7, at 18 (analyzing
how Justice Thomas “incorporates his own views of social reality” into cases).
353
See Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action
Debate, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1713 (1997) (arguing, for example, that “affirmative
action has become to the African-American community what abortion rights have
become for the feminist community—the constitutive issue, the program because of
which we find ourselves a part of the debate rather than disempowered outsiders”).
354
See supra Part II.
355
FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 63 (noting how Anderson discussed Whites in
“coded language his slave ancestors used to describe their owners,” such as “buckra, a
West African word for ‘demon’”).
356
FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 63.
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“could not depend on white people for help.”357 Even though some of
Thomas’s experiences, unlike his grandfather’s, led him to accept that
some whites could be helpful and encouraging, such as the white nuns
who taught Thomas in Catholic school,358 central to Justice Thomas’s
views about the route to racial equality is his belief that black people can
and should depend only upon themselves in part because the government
itself is often the tool used to create two separate, but unequal worlds for
groups. As the Justice once declared, “I lived under two sets of books. . . .
I’m not going back to two sets of books again.”359 Indeed, a critical
component of black conservatism itself is the notion that Blacks should
not support programs such as affirmative action or policies that provide
leniency for criminal defendants because they fail truly to address the
problems of the black community and serve only the purpose of assuaging
the guilty consciences of white liberals.360 In other words, black
conservatives’ support of colorblindness rests—oddly enough—entirely
on their blackness, or more specifically, their belief that their blackness is
the very reason they cannot rely on social welfare, government assistance,
or benign policies such as affirmative action.
On that same note, Justice Thomas’s life and jurisprudence reveals
exactly how devastating racism can be and how an individual’s thoughts,
beliefs, and even jurisprudence, regardless of claims of colorblindness and
neutrality, are shaped by experiences with race and racism, both subtle
and obvious, 361 or, in the case of persons with white-skin privilege, either
their lack of experience with racism or their relationships with people who
357

FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 64 (“No white bank lent Anderson the money he
needed to start his business or build his own home.”).
358
FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 66 (describing how the nuns at Thomas’s Catholic
school made their students, all of whom were black, feel differently about Whites).
359
Quoted in FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 72 (quotations omitted).
360
See Tushnet, Black Nationalism, supra note 243, at 330 (describing how Justice
Thomas’s views on education “are infused with scorn for policies supported by elites that
assuage their consciences by seeming to address . . . problems [plaguing the black
community] without doing so and that allow elites to maintain essentially undisturbed
institutions with which they are familiar and from which they benefit”).
361
See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious
Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 35 n.4 (1994)
(noting that “Blacks are likely to be somewhat aware that law has played a role in
maintaining racial privilege” and that “Whites, although aware that racial subordination is
a problem, are unlikely to view racism as a constant or central feature of American life”).
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are deeply affected by it.362 Regardless of how one describes Justice
Thomas’s jurisprudence, it is clear that the Justice is deeply influenced by
his life experiences when deciding questions that directly implicate
race.363 For example, one scholar Professor Scott Gerber, who argues that
Justice Thomas conceives of civil rights as a individual rather than a
group concern,364 has maintained that Thomas changes his approach in
deciding “race” cases by shifting from a conservative originalist approach
on civil liberties and federalism cases365 to one of a liberal originalist366
on civil rights cases.367
Indeed, the influence of race and racial identity was most recently
and prominently witnessed during oral arguments and in Justice Thomas’s
dissent in Virginia v. Black,368 a case concerning the constitutionality of a
Virginia statute that made it “unlawful for any person or persons with the
intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to
be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public
place.”369 In that case, Justice Thomas broke with his long-standing
362

Cf. Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur,
44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217–20 (1992) (“Like most of my counterparts who grew up in
the Southwest in the 1930s and 1940s, I had not been personally exposed to racial
tensions before Brown. . . . But as I listened that day to Justice Marshall talk eloquently
to the media about the social stigmas and lost opportunities suffered by African American
children in state-imposed segregated school, my awareness of race-based disparities
deepened. I did not, could not, know it then, but the man who would, as a lawyer and
jurist, captivate the nation would also, as colleague and friend, profoundly influence me. .
. . Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still catch myself looking expectantly for his
raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just once more, another story that
would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.”).
363
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 277 (manuscript at 39-47, on file with author)
(detailing how Justice Thomas, much like Justice Marshall, brings his experiences as a
black man to the bench).
364
See GERBER, supra note 3, at 50.
365
A conservative originalist approach focuses on the framers’ intentions in
deciding constitutional questions. See id. at 193.
366
A liberal originalist approach “appeals to the ideal of equality at the heart of the
Declaration of Independence.” Id. at 193.
367
See id. at 193; see also Jagan Nicholas Ranjan, Book Review, The Politicization
of Clarence Thomas, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2084, 2093 (2003) (maintaining that “Justice
Thomas’s jurisprudence on race departs from the originalism that undergirds most of his
jurisprudence”).
368
123 S. Ct. 1536 (2002).
369
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–423 (Michie 1996).
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practice of remaining silent during oral arguments370 to speak “in a voice
of color in analyzing the harm caused by cross burning.”371 Justice
Thomas’s exchange with the attorney from the Department of Justice, who
was arguing in favor of the constitutionality of the Virginia statute, was as
follows:
QUESTION: Mr. Dreeben, aren’t you understating the––
the effects of––of the burning cross? This statute was
passed in what year?
MR. DREEBEN: 1952 originally.
QUESTION: Now, it’s my understanding that we had
almost 100 years of lynching and activity in the South by
the Knights of Camellia and––and the Ku Klux Klan, and
this was a reign of terror and the cross was a symbol of
that reign of terror. Was—isn’t that significantly greater
than intimidation or a threat?
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think they’re coextensive, Justice
Thomas, because it is—
QUESTION: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you’re
actually understating the symbolism on––of and the effect
of the cross, the burning cross. I––I indicated, I think, in
the Ohio case that the cross was not a religious symbol and
that it has––it was intended to have a virulent effect. And
I––I think that what you’re attempting to do is to fit this
into our jurisprudence rather than stating more clearly
what the cross was intended to accomplish and, indeed,
that it is unlike any symbol in our society.
370

Dahlia Lithwick, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2002, at A35 (noting that Justice Thomas “speaks only four or fives times a year, less
often than most of his colleagues speak during an average morning”).
371
Guy-Uriel Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the
Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 29-34) (arguing
that Virginia v. Black represents a complete course reversal with respect to the Court’s
approach to the constitutionality of anti-cross burning statutes).
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MR. DREEBEN: Well, I don’t mean to understate it, and I
entirely agree with Your Honor’s description of how the
cross has been used as an instrument of intimidation
against minorities in this country. That has justified 14
States in treating it as a distinctive—
QUESTION: Well, it’s—it’s actually more than
minorities. There’s certain groups. And I––I just––my fear
is that the--there was no other purpose to the cross. There
was no communication of a particular message. It was
intended to cause fear—
MR. DREEBEN: It—
QUESTION:

––and

to

terrorize

a

population.372

As this colloquy demonstrates, for Justice Thomas, the burning of a cross
with the intent to intimidate contained no expressive value but rather was
conduct not subject to a First Amendment analysis, because its history and
use in society had left it with no other cultural meaning but “lawlessness”
and a “well-grounded fear of physical violence” for its victims.373 It was
Justice Thomas’s race and experiences with racism as a black man
growing up in the segregated South that shaped his view of a burning
cross, and in turn, helped to shape those of his colleagues on the bench.374
372

Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2002)
(No. 01-1107).
373
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1564 (“‘After the mother saw the burning cross, she was
crying on her knees in the living room. [She] felt feelings of frustration and intimidation
and feared for her husband’s life. She testified what the burning cross symbolized to her
as a black American: ‘murder, hanging, rape, lynching. Just about anything bad that you
can name. It is the worst thing that can happen to a person’ Mr. Heisser told the
probation officer that at the time of the occurrence, if the family did not leave, he
believed someone would return to commit murder. . . . Seven months after the incident,
the family still lived in fear. . . . This is a reaction reasonably to be anticipated from this
criminal conduct.’”).
374
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 277 (manuscript at 44-47, on file with the
author) (discussing the impact of Justice Thomas’s statements during oral arguments). In
the end, the majority in Black rejected Justice Thomas’s position that there was no need
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Moreover, it is this same influence of race that separates Justice
Thomas’s jurisprudence from that of Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas’s
alleged “puppeteer.”375 Although Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas both
adhere to principles of formal equality, Justice Thomas’s support of the
principle has a clearly raced component to it in that it, much like his
conservatism in general, stems from his blackness—from his view that
Blacks can be protected only if they are treated exactly the same as
opposed to Justice Scalia’s view that all individuals should be treated
exactly the same for reasons of evenhandedness alone. For example,
Justice Thomas’s analysis of a need for colorblind admissions in his
dissent in Grutter was vastly different from that of Justice Scalia in the
decision.376 While Justice Scalia’s dissent centered on what he believed
to analyze the Virginia statute under any First Amendment tests because cross burning
constituted conduct, not expression. Id. at 1547-49. But while the majority rejected
Justice Thomas’s analysis on the statute and held that the prima facie provision within the
cross burning statute was facially unconstitutional, it did hold that the state could outlaw
cross burning that was carried out with the intent to intimidate because the practice was a
“particularly virulent form of intimidation.” Id. at 1549. Indeed, many have argued that
Justice Thomas’s words during oral argument were critical to shaping the majority’s
analysis of the case, which was, in many ways, contrary to the approach adopted by the
Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), where the Court held that the
banning of certain symbolic conduct, including cross burning, when done with
knowledge that it would arouse “anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender” was unconstitutional. See RAV, 505 U.S. at 380;
see also Charles, supra note 371, at 41-44 (arguing that other members of the court
deferred to Justice Thomas’s concept regarding the harms of cross-burning “[b]ecause
Justice Thomas––an African-American colleague, a conservative, raised in the south, a
victim of racism––possesses epistemic authority and commands epistemic deference”);
Lithwick, supra note 370, at A35 (“But with his personal narrative, Justice Thomas
changed the terms of the legal debate. After he spoke, members of the court took turns
characterizing burning crosses as uniquely threatening symbolic speech. . . .”); see also
Edward Lazarus, Making Sense of Thomas’ Cross Burning Remarks and First
Amendment Law (acknowledging that “the power of Thomas’s verbal assault on cross
burning, its authenticity and historical irrefutability derived directly from his identity and
perspective as the Court’s only African-American justice.”), available in
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/26/findlaw.analysis.lazarus.Thomas.
375
See FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 2 (“Liberal pundits like to say that the Court’s
black justice simply obeys Justice Antonin Scalia, as if, Thomas joked, ‘he was suddenly
my master up here.’”).
376
It also highly differed from that of Justice Rehnquist, whose dissent focused on
the notion of “critical mass,” contending that the law school’s program is nothing more
than an effort to achieve racial balancing. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2368 (Rehnquist, J.,
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to be inherent unfairness to non-minority individuals who did not receive
racial preferences377 and what he argued was the law school’s
inappropriate use of racial discrimination “to convey generic lessons in
socialization and good citizenship”378 Justice Thomas’s dissent focused
primarily on what he perceived as affirmative action’s damaging effects to
individual Blacks, including what he referred to as resulting stigma by
Whites who perceive affirmative action beneficiaries as inferior and
affirmative action’s unintended validation of traditional standards of
merit, in particular the LSAT, that work to disproportionately exclude
certain minorities.379 In fact, it was Justice Scalia who joined all parts of
Justice Thomas’s dissent and concurrence, specifically highlighting the
part of Justice Thomas’s dissent that questioned the University of
Michigan’s use of traditional standards of merit to maintain its elite status,
an offshoot of a critique that critical race scholars have consistently made
in the past.380 Like Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia was convinced “that
the allegedly “compelling state interest” at issue here is not the
incremental “educational benefit” that emanates from the fabled “critical
mass” of minority students, but rather Michigan’s interest in maintaining a
dissenting) (“But the correlation between the percentage of the Law School’s pool of
applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of the
admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be
dismissed as merely the result of the school paying ‘some attention to [the] numbers.’ As
the tables below show, from 1995 through 2000 the percentage of admitted applicants
who were members of these minority groups closely tracked the percentage of individuals
in the school’s applicant pool who were from the same groups.”).
377
See id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added) (sarcastically asserting that “[t]he nonminority individuals who are deprived of a
legal education, a civil service job, or any job at all by reason of their skin color will
surely understand”); see also Chander, supra note 100, at 120 n.292 (highlighting that
“Justice Scalia’s reference to the ‘nonminority individual’ is incorrect”, as “affirmative
action programs often exclude some racial minority groups—principally Asians—from
their benefits”).
378
Id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
379
See id. at 2350-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
380
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Official Elitism of Institutional Self Interest? 10
Reasons Why U.C. Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (And Why Other Good Law Schools
Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 600-13 (2001) (explaining how
standardized tests, such as the LSAT, are not good predictors of performance and highly
correlate with wealth); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and
Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711,1730-42 (1995) (deconstructing the myth of
objective merit and how it disadvantages minorities).
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“prestige” law school whose normal admissions standards
disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities.”381
Second, criticisms of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence as lacking all
independent thought, even in the face of clearly raced and distinct
jurisprudence on certain issues, demonstrate the intensity of the stereotype
of black incompetence and dependency.382 Why view Justice Thomas’s
voting record as evidence that he is a slave to Justice Scalia and not view
Justice Ginsburg’s voting record as evidence that she is a clone of Justice
Souter or Justice Souter’s voting record as evidence that he is a clone of
Justice Stevens or even Justice O’Connor’s voting record as evidence that
she is a clone?383 Given the actual numbers regarding the voting
relationships between judges, the only answer can be race, or more so, the
stereotype of black dependency and inferiority.384 After all, the most
recent statistics of the Justices’ voting relationships indicate that the
aforementioned pair of Justices have agreed in full on a greater percentage
of cases than Justices Thomas and Scalia, with Justice Ginsburg agreeing
in full with Justice Souter 85% of the time, Justice Souter agreeing with
Justice Stevens 77% of the time, and Justice O’Connor agreeing in full
with Chief Justice Rehnquist 79% of the time while Justice Thomas and
Justice Scalia agreed in full only 73% of the time.385
Justice Thomas (or one of his black conservative counterparts)
might argue that this difference in perceptions of pairs of judges is, in
part, due to the ill use of affirmative action and the damaging effect that
affirmative action has on Whites’ views regarding the competency of
minorities and women. As Justice Thomas remarked in Adarand, “These
programs stamp minorities with the badge of inferiority.”386 Indeed, as
some scholars have noted, Justice Thomas’s reference to this claimed
381
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effect of affirmative action was almost personal in Grutter.387
Justice Thomas’s argument about the stigma caused by affirmative
action, however, has less force when viewed along with similar criticisms
of Justice Marshall, whose life, politics, and jurisprudence stand in stark
contrast to Justice Thomas’s.388 The manner in which Justice Marshall
was regarded as “intellectually inferior” cannot be attributed to
affirmative action, but instead to the stigma that automatically attaches to
Blacks in our society.389 Unlike for Justice Thomas,390 there is absolutely
nothing to indicate that Justice Marshall was ever a beneficiary of
affirmative action. To begin, affirmative action clearly did not exist when
Marshall was applying to law school. Moreover, Justice Marshall
attended a then all-black law school, Howard University School of Law,
where he graduated first in his class.391 Additionally, Justice Marshall’s
record as an attorney was unlike most other Justices of the Supreme
Court, having won case after case before the Court prior to his
appointment. Had Justice Marshall done nothing more than win his
twenty-nine cases before joining the Supreme Court, one simply could not
deny that he was an intellectual force in the legal arena. Yet, he has still
been the subject of the same disparaging comments regarding alleged
387
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dependency on another Justice and a lack of intellectual power.392 When
denigrations of Justices Marshall and Thomas are viewed side by side, it
becomes clear that stigma of black incompetence and inferiority existed
long before affirmative action and that this stigma is likely to attach to the
story of any black justice for a long time to come.
Most of all, what Justice Thomas’s story may teaches us is that the
black community’s (or even more broadly, the liberal community’s)
conception of blackness or “black voice” is far too limited.393 The fact
that a black individual holds views in stark contrast with those of the
majority of black community (or even those that are perceived as harmful
to the black community) does not make his or her views or voice any less
“black” (so long as there is expressed concern for the black community)
or make his or her concern for black people any less sincere.394 In fact,
Justice Thomas’s voice is “raced” in a way that exhibits significant
concern for black people. For example, his vehement support for school
choice (as opposed to integration), his opposition to leniency for criminal
defendants, and his stance on affirmative action are all deeply grounded in
such concern, in particular, a concern that current policies are simply
band-aid solutions to festering problems in the black community, such as
392
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failing schools and black on black crime.395
Indeed, as I was researching and learning about black conservative
ideology, I found myself (surprisingly) nodding in agreement with some
of its concepts and understandings about the issues facing the black
community, even though I disagreed with the ultimate route proposed for
addressing these problems. Perhaps, this is Justice Thomas’s most
significant lesson for us all, with his seemingly contradictory “black
nationalist” and “Reagan conservative” views:396 not only that the voice
of the black conservative can be “raced” in a way that the voice of the
white conservative is not,397 but that the rift between the black
conservative and black liberal is not so wide after all.398 Perhaps, black
395
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conservatives and black liberals would both benefit from listening to each
other and taking the other group’s concerns seriously.399 After all, in spite
of everything, Justice Thomas appears to be just another brother on the
Supreme Court.
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